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The reverberations of acquisitions and mergers affect 
millions of people directly and indirectly annually. 
Managers are cited as the most highly impacted group. The 
resulting change is multilayered and interactive. The work 
environment and the organizational culture are redesigned to 
reflect the new order. Those affected must redefine goals, 
expectations, norms, beliefs, values, and assumptions which 
form the strategic connections to their organizational 
lives. 
The purpose of this research was to identify the 
obstacles and supports encountered by managers in 
integrating an organization following an acquisition or a 
merger and to deepen the understanding of the human dynamics 
involved. This research also sought to suggest means for 
preventing and resolving barriers to successful integration 
based on the experiences of those who have been a part of 
the process. In-depth interviews were conducted with three 
presidents or CEOs and 13 managers, six from the acquiring 
organization and seven from the acquired organization, 
representing three separate acquisitions in the textile 
industry. Applying the interpretive inquiry methodology, 
each interview was analyzed separately for the depth of 
meaning it brought to understanding the integration of 
acquisitions and mergers. The researcher examined the 
interview data to identify themes or patterns of 
experiences. 
Barriers and supports which appear to facilitate the 
successful integration of acquisitions or mergers were 
identified from the emerging themes. Implied strategies 
were suggested for pre-acquisition planning, change 
management, communication, and leadership which creates a 
positive environment. 
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Organizational mergers are not a new phenomenon. 
Acquisitions occurred at such a rapid pace at the turn of 
the century that one-third of all manufacturing firms were 
consolidated by 1902. Merger activity has set new records 
since 1960. It is estimated that between 1983 and 1987, 
approximately 10,000 companies changed hands (Meek, 
Woodworth, Dyer, 1988). 
Reasons for acquisitions and mergers vary from the 
procurement of new technological skills to softening the 
competition by buying it out. Basically, motivation centers 
upon combining companies and rationalizing their operations 
so that the resulting company is better able to produce 
goods and services, put more succinctly- to improve the 
bottom line. 
Studies indicate that many mergers do not work out 
well. Meek, Woodworth and Dyer (1988) cite examples in 
Managing By The Numbers. IBM purchased Rolm for $1.6 
billion in 1984 and Rolm lost over $100 million last year. 
Montgomery Ward has lost over $600 million since being 
acquired by Mobil. People Express was forced into 
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bankruptcy six months after acquiring Frontier Airlines. 
LTV's J and L Steel merger with Republic Steel in 1984 was 
heralded as the model solution for the industry. Losses 
forced the number two steel corporation in the nation to 
file Chapter 11 bankruptcy two years later. 
The impact of change is compounded by the insecurity 
resulting from these mergers. Mergers may, as illustrated, 
result in organizations closing or in layoffs. Chevron's 
takeover of Gulf resulted in the loss of 16,000 jobs. 
Termination notices were mailed to 1,650 Crocker National 
employees the same day Wells Fargo announced the 
acquisition. Five thousand others received warning notices 
(Meek and Hale 1988, cited in Meek, Woodworth and Dyer, 
1989). 
Korn-Ferry (cited in Kanter, 1989) surveyed senior 
executives on the biggest threats to an executive's career. 
Mergers and reorganizations were cited twice as often as the 
second factor of being in a slow growth industry. A recent 
survey of vice-presidents and personnel directors of the 100 
largest companies in the United States yielded similar 
results. Fifty-six percent responded that losing a job 
because of a merger or acquisition was their number one 
fear. It was cited more than twice the second most frequent 
response of burnout (Half, cited in Kanter, 1989). Such 
statistics suggest an exploration of the problems created by 
the integration of acquisitions and mergers would be 
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fruitful, particularly when examined from the vantage point 
of those who experience it. This study will examine the 
barriers and supports to integrating acquisitions and 
mergers by interviewing those who have actively participated 
in the process. 
The failure to merge the talents and energies of the 
members of the organization into a high performing team is 
as damaging to the combination as the loss of key talent and 
the insecurities of downsizing. The way the acquisition 
process is implemented makes a difference in preventing 
resistance by managers of acquired businesses to the 
consolidation of activities, reduced motivation after the 
acquisition, expenditure of energy on acquisitions leading 
to neglect of the existing business, and too much 
acquisition activity overloading the management systems 
(Kanter, 1989). All of which can prevent building a 
productive new organizational team. 
Overview 
Integrating an acquisition or merger necessitates 
change in many forms; therefore, the foundation of this 
study is an understanding of change and change management. 
The complex and pervasive effects of change are 
multilayered and interactive. Change seldomly occurs 
without stress, whether it is chosen or forced, because 
there must be an ending for every transition. There must be 
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a letting go of the old, not just outwardly, but inwardly to 
the connections which define the person (Bridges, 1980). The 
sixteenth century philosopher, Machiavelli, states in The 
Prince. 
It must be noted that there is nothing more difficult 
to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more 
dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of 
things. (1964) 
The rate and idea of change have become routinely 
perceived. Change has become a constant. Toffler (1970) 
described this roaring current of change as a process by 
which the future invades our lives. In Future Shock he 
emphasizes the importance of closely examining change not 
only from the "grand perspectives of history, but also from 
the vantage point of the living, breathing individuals who 
experience it" (p. 3) . 
Companies, like people, find it difficult to change, 
mainly because people run companies. Chandler explains, 
It's a complicated process, but the key point is that 
you have investments in equipment and in people that do 
things a certain way. Then how do you change? 
(Naisbitt & Aburdene, 1982, p. 14) 
Despite the difficulties involved, change pushes forward. 
Worker dissatisfaction and employer problems of high 
turnover-, absenteeism, and lower productivity may be 
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attributed in part to the difficulty in dealing with the 
changing definitions of work and organizations. 
Toffler (1990) attributes these changes to a power 
shift from power of muscle to power of the mind: 
...changes in the nature of power itself are 
revolutionizing relationships in the world of business. 
From the transformation of capital to the growing 
conflict between 'highbrow' and 'lowbrow' businesses, 
from the electronic supermarket to the rise of family 
business and the emergence of startling new 
organizational forms... These deep changes in business 
and the economy are paralleled by significant changes 
in politics, the media, and the global espionage 
industry. ...for today's power shift will transform 
them all. (p. 21) 
The integration of an acquisition or merger involves 
the merging of the "people functions" of an organization. 
Leaders implementing the process of change within an 
organization must understand that organizational cultures 
are the aggregate concept which consumes and connects the 
strategic, political, interpersonal, and institutional 
concepts of organizational life (Quinn and Kimberly, 1984). 
Without a recognition and understanding of an organization's 
culture, leaders may misdirect their efforts to manage and 
effect organizational change. 
The four most common reasons people resist change are 
(a) a desire not to lose something of value, (b) a 
misunderstanding of the change and its implications, (c) a 
belief that change does not make sense for the organization, 
and (d) a low tolerance for change. Understanding the 
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effects of the change process on those involved necessitates 
an awareness of what is valued in the workplace in order to 
help individuals make transitions- the letting go of the old 
and the acceptance of the new (Bridges, 1980). 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to identify the obstacles 
and supports encountered by managers in integrating an 
organization following an acquisition or merger and to 
suggest means for preventing and resolving barriers based on 
the experiences of those who have been involved in the 
process. These findings provided a data to critically 
examine the implications of existing prescriptive research 
for organizational change as it relates to the process of 
integrating organizations following an acquisition or 
merger. 
Research Questions 
The underlying intent of this research is to deepen the 
understanding of the human dynamics involved in the 
integration process of acquisitions and mergers. 
Specifically this research will address the following 
questions: (a) What are the identifiable patterns of 
experiences and perceptions on the integration process of 
acquisitions and mergers among managers who have been a part 
of the process? (b) What barriers and supports following a 
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merger or acquisition are identified by managers? (c) What 
similarities and differences in perceived barriers and 
supports are identified by managers in acquired 
organizations and managers in the acquiring organization? 
(d) Can differences in expectations between managers of 
acquired and acquiring organizations be identified? If 
these differences exist, how is the integration process 
impacted? (e) What procedures for prevention and resolution 
of the identified barriers can be suggested? The underlying 
"Why?" was explored through the applied interpretive inquiry 
and formed the basis for suggesting possible solutions to 
the identified barriers. 
Definition of Terms 
The following terms are presented to provide the reader 
an understanding of their meanings as related to this study. 
Acquisitions - This term applies to a transaction, or 
transactions by which one corporation obtains title to the 
substance of another. 
Change - The supplementing of one thing for another, 
transformation or alteration. 
Integration - The post-combination phase of the merger 
process in which the constituent parts of two organizations 
are combined into an integral whole. 
Leadership - The capacity to translate intention into 
reality and sustain it (Burns, 1978). 
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Merger - An exchange in which one of the two 
combining companies loses its identity in the other. 
Organizational Culture - Defines how people act within 
the organization even when the actions may lie in discord 
with written policies and procedure (Snyder, 1985). 
Parent Company - A corporation owning over 50% of the 
voting stock of another corporation. 
Successful Organization - An organization where 
initiative and spirit are maintained evidenced by employee 
morale, productivity and confidence in the organization. 
Limitations 
The reader is cautioned to be sensitive to the 
limitations of this study. The sample, by design, is 
limited. The emphasis is not on exploring the quantity of 
occurrences, but rather, on understanding the quality of the 
experience. The purpose here is to offer a depth of 
understanding born of interpreting experiences and emergent 
themes. 
The reader also must be sensitive to the subjectivity 
of the interview technique. The researcher is highly 
involved in the creation of meaning serving as the 
perceptual lens through which observations are made and 
interpreted (McCutcheon, 1981). To call for value-free 
standards of validation is a contradiction in terms, 
according to Cronbach (1980), a nostalgic longing for a 
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world that never was. The following four criteria may be 
used to validate these interpretations: (a) Is the line of 
reasoning sound? (b) Is sufficient evidence presented in 
support of the interpretations? (c) Is the interpretation in 
accord with what is known about (acquisitions and mergers)? 
(d) Does the interpretation promote significant 
understanding? (Eisner, 1981). 
This research aims to formulate and offer 
interpretations so others can share meanings made from them. 
Generalization is left to the reader based upon the 
assumption of the intersubjectivity of interpretations. The 
reader generalizes to his or her personal situation rather 
than the researcher offering generalizations to populations. 
Map for Remainder of the Dissertation 
The review of literature which follows in Chapter 2 
provides the theoretical framework for this research. 
Change, change management, worker needs, and the acquisition 
and merger process are explored. Chapter 3 describes the 
methodology used to gather and analyze data. Interview data 
is presented and analyzed based upon the research questions 
in Chapter 4. The final chapter, 5, provides a summary, 
conclusions, and recommendations for further study. 
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Chapter II 
Review of Related Literature 
The purpose of this study is to identify the obstacles 
and supports in creating successful organizations from 
mergers and acquisitions. The study follows the premise 
that the probability of creating successful organizations 
resulting from mergers and acquisitions is a function of the 
management of the change process. Change is either 
facilitated or obstructed by the strategies employed. 
The review of related literature begins with the broad 
concept of change with a discussion of planned change. 
Focus narrows to organizational change. The organizational 
culture and worker needs are explored because this research 
is concerned with the merging of the people functions of an 
organization. Current research and related literature on 
mergers and acquisitions follows to provide the specific 
context for this research. 
Change 
Benne, Bennis, and Chin (1985) introduce The Planning 
of Change stating that most students of our society agree 
that the one major invariant is the tendency toward 
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movement, growth, development, process: change (p. 2) . 
Toffler (1970) reminds readers that change is not a new 
phenomenon. It began with the earliest forms of life when 
survival depended upon the ability to adapt. 
Econs ago the shrinking seas cast millions of unwilling 
aquatic creatures onto the newly created beaches. 
Deprived of their familiar environment, they died, 
gasping and clawing for each additional instant of 
eternity. Only a fortunate few, better suited to 
amphibious existence survived the shock of change, 
(p. 289) 
Toffler (1970) further illustrates the phenomenal rate 
of change by dividing the last 50,000 years of man's 
existence into lifetimes of approximately 62 years. 
Of the 800 such lifetimes, 650 were spent in caves. Man's 
movement from stone to space has occurred within less than 
the last 20% of his existence. 
King and Cleveland (1980) classify environmental 
changes as either systematic or random. Systematic changes 
imply continuation and can be sub-classified as temporary or 
permanent. Temporary systematic changes require adjustments 
of the body while permanent systematic requires adaptation. 
Random changes are dealt with by some type of reaction. "No 
living system can survive unless it has the intrinsic 
capability to deal with the entire range of environmental 
changes" (p. 8). 
Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch (1974) compare Group 
Theory and the Theory of Logical Types to identify two 
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different types of change. The first occurs within a given 
system which remains unchanged. This change is referred to 
as first order change. Second order change changes the 
system. 
Early literature on change traced to the Greeks focuses 
on first order change. 
The Greeks seem to have known only the first of the 
two. 'Nothing comes into being or is destroyed. 
Rather, a thing is mixed with or separated from already 
existing things,1 asserts Anaxogras in his 
seventeenth fragment. Similarly, for Aristotle change 
is the passage from potentiality to actuality and he 
expressly rules out what we nowadays would call a shift 
from level to metalevel, when he writes: 'There cannot 
be motion of motion, or becoming of becoming, or in 
general change of change.' The later Greeks and the 
Middle Ages tended to see change as the antinomy 
between being and becoming. Only Heraclitus, it 
appears, envisaged change in a different perspective. 
In addition to his well know dictum about the 
impossibility of stepping into the same stream twice, 
'all change is contradictory; therefore contradiction 
is the very essence of reality.' (cited in Watzlawick, 
et al., p. 10) 
Prior (1962) contends that "modern science began when people 
became accustomed to the idea of change changing, e.g. to 
the idea of acceleration as opposed to simple motion" 
(p. 3) . 
Understanding the distinction between difficulties and 
problems according to Watzlawick, et al., (1974) is 
important in applying change to bring about solutions. 
Difficulties are described as an undesirable state of 
affairs which either can be resolved by some common sense 
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action for which no special problem solving skills are 
necessary, or more frequently, undesirable life situations 
for which there exists no known solutions. Problems are 
impasses or deadlocks which are created and maintained 
through the mishandling of difficulties. Three basic ways 
in which mishandling occurs are identified. 
(1) A solution is attempted by denying the problem. 
Action is necessary but is not taken. 
(2) Change is attempted as a solution to an 
unchangeable difficulty. Action is taken when 
it should not be. 
(3) An error is made in applying the appropriate 
type of change. First order change is attempted 
when second order is needed and second order 
change is attempted when first order change is 
appropriate. (Watzlawick, et al, 1974, p. 39) 
Planned Change 
Man has long attempted to be master not victim of his 
universe including changes in the social and environmental 
structures within which he must function. The idea of 
social scientists participating in and actively influencing 
the planning and implementation of social change has been a 
center of controversy in America since the emergence of the 
idea in the late nineteenth century (Benne, Chin, Bennis, 
1985). The debate centered upon two broad philosophical 
issues in the early 1900's: 
should or should not men seek, through deliberate and 
collaborative forethought in the present, to mold the 
shape of their collective future? Or should confidence 
rather be placed in a principle of automatic 
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adjustment, operating within the process of history 
to re-equilibrate, without human forethought yet in the 
interest of progress and human welfare, the inescapable 
human upsets and dislocations of a changing society. 
(Benne, Bennis, Chin, 1985, p. 14) 
This debate is best illustrated by discussing the polar 
approaches of Lester F. Ward, one of the earliest social 
scientists, and William Graham Sumner, a leading sociologist 
of the era. Ward envisioned a major role for social 
scientists in planning the management of human affairs. 
Man's destiny is in his own hands. Any law that he can 
comprehend he can control. He cannot diminish the 
power of nature, but he can direct them... His power 
over nature is unlimited. He can make it his servant 
and appropriate to his own use all the mighty forces of 
the universe... Human institutions are not exempt from 
this all-pervading spirit of improvement. They, too, 
are artificial, conceived in the ingenious brain and 
wrought with mental skill born of an inventive genius. 
The passion for their improvement is of a piece with 
the impulse to improve the plow or the steam 
engine... Intelligence, heretofore a growth, is 
destined to become a manufacture... The origination 
and distribution of knowledge can no longer be left to 
chance or to nature. They are to be systematized and 
erected into true arts. (Commager, 1950, pp. 208, 210, 
213-214) 
Sumner viewed Ward's proclamation as folly and 
encouraged "laissez faire." 
If we can acquire a science of society based on 
observation of phenomena and study of forces, 
we may hope to gain some ground slowly toward 
the elimination of old errors and the 
reestablishment of a sound and natural social 
order. Whatever we gain that way will be by 
growth, never in the world by any 
reconstruction of society or the plans of some 
enthusiastic social architect. The latter is 
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only repeating the old error over again, and 
postponing all our chances of real 
improvement. Society needs first of all to be 
free from these meddlers- that is, to be let 
alone. Here we are, then once more back at 
the old doctrine 1laissiz faire.1 Let us 
translate it into blunt English, and it will 
read- Mind your own business. It is nothing 
but the doctrine of liberty. Let every man be 
happy in his own way. (Commager, 1950, pp. 201-202) 
Between the 1900's and the 1950's, thought and practice 
shifted away from Sumner's "laissez faire" approach. Human 
interactions designed to shape and modify the 
institutionalized behaviors of man became familiar features 
of the social landscape (Benne, Bennis, Chin, 1985). These 
interventions deliberately introduced and coached changes in 
behaviors and relationships. 
Advocates and students of planned change shifted from 
questioning whether to plan change to how to plan change in 
particular settings and situations. The 1950's brought the 
realization that man had no choice in seeking to plan 
continuing changes in the patterns of their lives (Benne, 
Bennis, Chin, 1985). 
The prevailing planning model of the 1950's was an 
engineering model of applied science. An engineering model 
requires plans to be made by experts to meet the needs of 
the people who are affected. These "experts" interpret what 
the needs are. The focus is on relevant, objective, 
technical, economic conditions and requirements. Monologic 
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persuasion is applied to lead those affected by the plan to 
consent (Benne, Bennis, Chin, 1985). 
Benne, Bennis, and Chin (1985) advocate the clinical 
model of planned change. In this model the experts work 
collaboratively with those affected by the plan "in order to 
inform them and to empower them toward participation in 
making, evaluating, and remaking operating plans" (p. 17) . 
Chin and Benne (1985) identify three types of 
strategies for change characteristic of the clinical model. 
The first is the use of empirical-rational strategies. This 
set of strategies is founded upon two basic assumptions. 
First, men are rational and second, men will follow rational 
self-interest once it is revealed to them. These strategies 
are most frequently employed in America and Western Europe. 
Normative-re-educative is the second type of 
strategies. Persons involved in change with this set of 
strategies must change their normative orientation to old 
patterns and develop commitments to new ones. Changes in 
normative orientation involve changes in attitudes, values, 
skills, and significant relationships, in addition to 
changes in knowledge, information, or intellectual 
rationales for action and practice. Power strategies form 
the third type. Persons with greater power influence those 
with lesser power to accept their plans, directions and 
leadership (Chin & Benne, 1985, p. 23). 
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Watzlawich, Weakland, and Fisch (1974) draw attention 
to Utopian attempts at change contending that specific 
consequences result, and that these consequences tend to 
perpetuate or even worsen what was to be changed. The belief 
that one can find an all embracing solution, or the Utopia 
syndrome, can take one of three possible forms. The first, 
described as introjective, produces consequences more 
psychological than social. This results from a feeling of 
personal inadequacy in being unable to reach one's goal. The 
failure to attain the Utopian goal is attributed to personal 
ineptititude rather than to its Utopian nature. The second 
form of the utopia syndrome embodies procrastination with 
the belief that the process is more valuable than the 
attainment of the goal. This form may generate problems 
because of the belief that transitions will occur without 
problem. Projective is the third possible form and is a 
morally righteous stance based upon the conviction of having 
found the truth. It is sustained by the resulting 
missionary responsibility of changing the world (pp. 40-56). 
Watzlawick, et al., (1974) further state that it is the 
basic premise that things should be a certain way which is 
the problem and which requires change, and not the way 
things are. First order change is attempted where only 
second order change can lead to a solution. 
The major social structures to which man has attempted 
to apply models of planned change are organizations. The 
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move of civilization from the agricultural to the industrial 
era was the impetus for the torrent of changes which 
followed. A new social organization, the corporation, was 
formed along the way. The corporation offered pooled 
resources, shared risks, and the flexibility of exploration. 
Paradoxically, the structure of the corporation created a 
numbing conformity, uniformity, and overdependence on 
rational functioning and a solid resistance to change 
(Garfield, 1986). 
Organizational Change 
Naisbitt and Aburdene (1985) describe the corporation 
as an analogue for the rest of society contending that this 
is one of those rare times in history when the two crucial 
elements for social change are present- new values and 
economic necessity. 
Companies, like people, find it difficult to change, 
primarily because people run companies. The historian, 
Chandler (1977), describes it as a: 
complicated process, but the key point is that you have 
investments in equipment and in people that do things a 
certain way. Then how do you change? (p. 86) 
Organizational change as a category of social change 
mainly lies within a functionalist perspective about 
organizations. The organization is viewed as an entity 
which can be manipulated to some degree to effect change in 
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either the structures or patterns of interaction within the 
organization (Foster, 1986). 
Goodman and associates (1982) categorize organizational 
change with adaptation. The adaptation model suggests that 
certain organizations adapt to their particular environment 
better than other organizations; and consequently, endure 
(cited in Aldrich, 1979). 
Foster (1986) describes a three-step process of 
adaptation as a 
variation in which the organization differentiates 
itself in a random fashion; selection, in which those 
characteristics appropriate for the particular 
environment are selected; and retention, in which 
the organization maintains and reinforces 
characteristics suitable to a particular environment, 
(p. 86) 
This model has drawbacks in the examination of change. 
The assertions that organizations fail because they fail to 
adapt and organizations succeed because they successfully 
adapt are taken as self-evident. 
The alternative category of adaptive organizational 
change suggests that decisions of managers in organizations 
affect the life of the organization (Foster, 1986). Child's 
(1972) strategic choice model supports the evolutionary 
model whereby the strategic choices of managers cause 
organizations to adapt or not to adapt. This approach is 
framed in extended time periods. Application to the 
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planning of organizational change is difficult due to the 
extended time periods involved (cited in Foster, 1986). 
Foster (1986) also identifies five models which address 
the major conceptualization about change in organizations: 
the personal therapeutic model, the systems-organic model, 
the political-economic model, and the symbolic-cultural 
model of change. 
Each of these models attempts to define an 
aspect of reality as the context for organizational 
change. ...each model is incomplete; those 
dimensions important to other models are not 
considered. Organizational change can be likened to a 
large layer cake; the cake comprises a number of 
ingredients held together by some inexplicable 
chemistry. Various layers represent the various 
aspects of change: one layer represents rational 
behavior and rational attempts to effect change in an 
organization: another layer represents the political 
environment of the organization; a third, the personal 
and emotional make-up of the organization, and so on. 
The whole cake is covered by, and held together 
through, an icing consisting of symbols, metaphors, and 
culture ...change programs and processes of change 
borrow to some degree from each of the models, (p. 150) 
A discussion of the five models follows beginning with 
the Rational-Managerial approach. This approach assumes 
that the organization is populated by rational actors just 
as the empirical-rational strategy for change depends upon 
rational thought processes. Large scale efforts to change 
organizations dependent on management initiative and 
abundant collections of data are in this category. Havelock 
(1973) provides a six step rational-managerial model. The 
"change agent" relies on the following procedures: 
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Stage 1: Enter into the organization: recognize 
its clients, leaders, and gatekeepers and its position 
in regard to its environment. 
Stage 2: Make a diagnosis: identify the 
organization's problems and the opportunities; determine its 
goals and the amount of support behind them. 
Stage 3: Discover the available resources: 
learn who are experts and who are innovators. 
Stage 4: Choose a solution: after diagnosing the 
problem and identifying the resources, find a solution 
through research, brainstorming, and testing possible 
alternatives. 
Stage 5: Build acceptance for the chosen solution: 
communicate the solution to other actors; identify and 
work around the barriers. 
Stage 6: Stabilize the innovation and build in a 
capacity for self-renewal. 
Baldridge and Deal (1983) contend that the 
rationalistic approaches to change are unsuccessful because 
organizations and their members can not be fully rational 
(cited in Foster, 1986). 
The second model, personal-therapeutic, rests on the 
major assumption that change must begin in the individual at 
an interpersonal level. Meaningful organizational change, 
therefore, can result only from change generated in the 
individual members of the organization. Lewin's work (1951) 
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is the classic model of the personal-therapeutic approach. 
He identifies three stages in the change process: 
unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. Schein (1969) 
elaborated on the stages. 
Unfreezing, Schein says, assumes that significant 
behavior, beliefs, attitudes, and so on, are 
reorganized by one's self-image. In Goffman's language, 
this results in a 'presentation of self' to others in 
various contexts. The presentation can differ 
depending on the context, so one's self-image in the 
home may substantially differ from that operative at 
work. Unfreezing may occur when the self-image is 
•disconfirmed' by any number of processes, (cited in 
Foster, 1986, p. 153) 
The process of disconfirmation allows for the 
possibility of change. The cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957) brought about by the disconfirmation of the self-image 
requires a redefining of values and beliefs in a 
revised context. The new image is stabilized and practiced 
in various situations. Refreezing occurs if other 
individuals confirm it. The process reverts to step one if 
the new image is disconfirmed. 
Organizations are assumed to be similar to organisms-
growing, developing, changing, and dying- in the 
Organic-Systems model. This model further assumes that 
organizations consist of interrelated and interdependent 
subsystems. The movement of organizational development grew 
from the organic-systems model. The conceptual framework 
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and strategies of organizational development aim to make 
organizations self-correcting and self-renewing. 
Organizational development looks at three levels of 
activity according to Foster (1986): the interpersonal, the 
subsystem, and the organization as a whole. Effectively 
adapting to the changing conditions in its environment is 
the ultimate goal of organizational development (p. 155). 
Political-economic approaches examine the effects of 
politics and economics as models for change. This model has 
several distinguishable characteristics. First, the 
organization is viewed as a political system that has real 
and symbolic resources. Second, it postulates that the 
organization has 'political actors' with self-interests at 
stake. Third, coalitions form within the organization and 
develop strategies for achieving mutual control of certain 
resources. The final characteristic is the existence of a 
political environment where conflict is an integral and 
desirable component. The manipulation of the economic and 
political processes creates change. 
The symbolic and cultural aspects model of 
organizational change suggests that change in the metaphors 
of an organization will result in changes in the 
organization. Confused or conflicting symbols result in 
confused or conflict-ridden organizations. 
Turner (1972) observed several types of rituals in 
modern organizations. Rites of passage may occur when 
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individuals physically move into or about in the 
organization. Rites of sameness or difference reinforce 
differences or similarities and rituals of performance. 
Foster (1986) contends that the fallacy of this approach is 
that understanding the norms, mores, and relationships that 
govern behavior does not automatically indicate an ability 
to move beyond those same rituals to cause change. 
Foster (1986) proposes a critical perspective on change 
that requires a synoptic overview of change in society. 
Change in this perspective begins with directing change at 
the people of an organization, not at the organization 
itself. He and Benson (1977) propose that an organization 
is always in the process of changing. This critical 
perspective adopts Oakes and Sirotnik's (1986) three part 
paradigm involving three modes of inquiry: 
empirical, aimed at gathering the facts; interpretive, 
aimed at probing the meanings and understandings actors 
give to events; and critical, aimed at exposing and 
analyzing conditions that lead to the suppression of 
the human spirit, (cited in Foster, 1986, p. 165) 
Waterman (1987) also contends that the only true source 
of renewal in a company is the individual. Naisbitt and 
Aburdene (1985) report that 
the current dynamic period when the economic imperative 
for a more competitive, more productive workforce is 
leading us back to the kind of humanistic values... 
trust, freedom, respect for the individual, (p. 2) 
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The wide acceptance of McGregor's Theory Y which states 
in effect that people will be more effective if they are 
treated with respect has produced trends in work teams and 
participative management. 
Organizations are projected to face labor shortages 
with resulting competition for the best people. Human 
capital has replaced dollar capital as the strategic 
resource, meaning people and profits are inexorably linked 
(Naisbitt, Aburdene, 1985). Strategic planning models must 
move from concern with numbers to a people orientation. 
Michael P. Schulhap (1985), Vice-president and Director of 
the Sony Corporation of America states, 
It is not entirely coincidental that the same year that 
we have seen industry increasing, almost exclusively, 
run by financially oriented business school graduates, 
we have also seen the worst productivity performance 
since the Depression. (cited in Naisbitt, Aburdene, 
1985, p. 20) 
Makridakis and Heau (1987) state that for any strategy 
for change to be relevant and applicable it needs (a) to be 
used proactively, (b) to accept our limited ability to 
predict environmental changes, (c) take into account the 
organizational and political dimensions of corporate life, 
and (d) to be accepted by a majority of those concerned with 
strategy as a realistic tool for more effectively coping 
with the future. 
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An understanding of the context of current 
organizational change and the projected change is necessary 
to achieve relevant change. Naisbitt and Aburdene (1985) 
identifies ten forces that represent the context in which 
the corporation is being re-invented: 
1. The shift in strategic resources from an industrial 
to an information society. 
2. The coming seller's market and the new competition 
for the best employees. 
3. The whittling away of middle management. 
4. The continuing entrepreneurial revolution. 
5. The emergence of the new variegated work force. 
6. The demographic revolution of working women. 
7. The growing use of intuition and vision. 
8. The mismatch between our education system and the 
needs of the new information society. 
9. The rising importance of corporate health issues. 
10. The values of the baby boomers, those born between 
1946 and 1964, who are now populating the ranks of 
management, (pp. 5-6) 
As with other social structures where people come 
together for an extended time with some degree of 
permanence, organizations have cultures. Efforts to realize 
change within the corporation can not ignore the corporate 
culture. 
Organizational Cultural Change 
Corporate culture is defined by Snyder (1985) as 
the system of norms, beliefs, assumptions, and values 
that determine how people in the organization act- even 
when that action may be at odds with written policies 
and formal reporting relationships, (p. 164) 
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It is the aggregate concept which consumes and connects the 
strategic, political, interpersonal, and institutional 
concepts of organizational life (Quinn and Kimberly, 1984). 
According to Lundberg (1984), "culture is anchored in 
the epistemological structures which dominate among a 
culture's members" (p. 71). He is referring to the deeper 
level of culture from which one draws meaning and the values 
and assumptions used to make sense of the world. On the 
surface level culture determines language, knowledge, 
transmissions and behaviors. At this level traditions, 
customs, and rituals are organized according to norms, roles 
and role relationships (Quinn and Kimberly, 1984). 
Culture is a key management tool in institutionalizing 
change. Change here, however, is challenging. As Sarason 
(1972) points out, in creating a new setting from an 
existing one, there is the supposition that the new is an 
improvement over the old. Not only must the values, 
commitments, and understandings be released, but there must 
be a realization that they may have been flawed. There must 
be an ending, a letting go of the old, not just outwardly, 
but inwardly to the connections, which define the person 
(Bridges, 1980). Tichy and Ulrich (1984) explain that the 
ending process is a turbulent time. 
Major transitions unleash powerful conflicting forces 
in people. The change invokes simultaneous positive 
and negative personal feelings of fear and hope, 
anxiety and relief, pressure and stimulation, leaving 
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the old and accepting a new direction, loss of meaning 
and new meaning, threat to self-esteem and new sense of 
value. (p.60) 
Albert (1984) suggests four basic principles for the 
process of cultural redevelopment. The first is a summary 
of the past. This involves explaining what is ending, 
validating the accomplishments and dreams which existed 
there. This stage provides closure. The second principle 
is justification. This involves describing the new 
direction, justifying the change and the need to do it now. 
Continuity, the third principle, provides the link from the 
past to the future- identification of those values which 
will be preserved. The final principle, eulogizing the 
past, recognizes the sense of extended association and 
validates the loss of that association. 
Prior to beginning a review of suggested strategies for 
cultural change it is important to beware of the potential 
pitfall of Utopian change thinking within the context of 
organizational cultural change. These strategies are not 
curealls. As Snyder (1985) notes, "...one organization's 
pheasant may be a turkey to another" (p. 170). He offers 
four points for context. 
1. We are constantly influenced by our cultures; 
2. Without knowledge of those cultures we are apt to 
be led astray in our efforts to manage and change 
our organizations; 
3. With such knowledge, we will be in a much better 
position to strategically invent the future of 
those organizations; 
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4. While the job of culture management and change is 
certainly not a simple task, there are an 
increasing number of tools up to use to use 
these ...and ...to improve them. Failing that, 
we can expect to find ourselves further emersed 
in the problems of painfully slow culture change in 
times that demand rapid response, (p. 170) 
Change agents are included in suggested strategies. 
(Bennis, 1984 and Taylor, 1987) As defined by Taylor the 
task of the change agent is to work with management at 
various levels to help define problems and design programs 
directed "at changing the orientation of the organization to 
fit new circumstances" (p. 28). 
Bennis (1984) offers a sequence of steps the change 
agent uses to catalyze change in organizations: 
1. finding facts, 
2. developing personal awareness, 
3. training people in new interaction modes, 
4. creating an organizational 'Cultures' to link 
the interests of various organizational groups, 
5. developing methods for more open joint 
problem solving, 
6. obtaining agreement on goals for the organization 
and anticipating and overcoming barriers to implementation, 
7. agreeing on implementation steps, and 
8. stabilizing change. 
Following a study of CEO's, Quinn (1980) contends that 
successful change managers shared two characteristics. 
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First, they recognized the impact their incremental 
decisions and action patterns had on the credibility and 
perceived directions of their new strategies. Second, they 
tried to keep in mind the symbolic implications of each 
individual act and the actions applicability in resolving 
the immediate issue. 
McKinsey and company (1985) describe 'levers' within a 
framework for cultural change. 
1. Superordinate goals: the guiding vision 
and philosophy of the organization 
2. Management style and action 
3. Human resource management 
4. Organizational structure 
5. Administrative and control systems 
6. Planning 
7. Information and communication 
8. Strategy 
9. Physical design and setting 
10. External relations (cited in Snyder, 1985, p. 169) 
Snyder (1985) warns that certain components of the 
organization are 'sacred' when applying these 'levers' 
within the framework. He advises the culture sensitive 
manager to look for corridors of indifference originally 
described by Wrapp (1967). Employees may become cynical 
about management techniques which, 
for example, claim to promote a long-term time 
horizon, but leave reward systems, management 
information systems and the content of management 
meetings untouched, (cited in Snyder, 1985, p. 170) 
Although methods vary because of the 'unknowables' 
involved in implementing cultural change, Quinn (1980) 
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identified the following common characteristics. 
1. Major changes take three to five years. 
2. Programs to achieve significant change must be 
phased and largely undertaken bottom up, but the legitimacy 
of alternatives must be affirmed by the support of key 
people at the top. 
3. Successful change processes must deal with both 
intellectual content and emotional issues. 
4. Effective change processes must be adapted to the 
specific requirements of the most important subsystems 
supporting the target system. 
5. New goals tend to emerge toward the end of 
the change process, not at its beginning. 
Kimberly and Quinn (1984) contend that cultural change 
is an organizational activity which can only occur if a 
large number of people change their beliefs about how the 
organization works and their roles in it. Changes, 
therefore, will only occur as a result of the interaction of 
people and events within the strategies designed to create 
change. 
Thus, the process of creating cultural change 
involves developing people who understand the changes 
that are desired, who have the skills to create them, 
and who can continually invent new programs and 
structures to reinforce and accelerate the process of 
changing. (p. 236) 
32 
The plan cannot be fixed. Change is a process; therefore, 
it requires a flexible plan. 
Key to the success of planned change are the 
individuals who develop and implement the plan, as well as, 
those whose cooperation is required for the plan to succeed. 
The human element with inherent needs, goals, and histories 
which shape perceptions are important variables to be 
considered by those who strive to achieve successful 
organizational change. 
The Worker 
Today's workforce reflects the dramatic transition that 
has been taking place in society at large. It is changing 
in the level of education, lifestyles and values, and 
attitudes toward work. There is a new work ideal emerging in 
America. There is a widespread expectation that work should 
be fulfilling- and that "work should be fun" (Naisbitt and 
Aburdene, 1985, p. 4) . 
There is an increased interest in interpersonal 
relationships and rising feelings of entitlement. 
Organizational leaders have recognized the fallacy of 
concentrating solely upon economic needs as the sole 
motivation of employees. Changes in organizational 
structures and decision making processes reflect these 
changes in the workforce and are more appropriate to current 
employee needs. 
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General agreement exists that worker cooperation, 
motivation, and involvement seem to depend heavily upon a 
positive working environment which includes a degree of 
worker participation in and control of their own jobs, and 
the nature and structure of the work itself. In A Passion 
For Excellence; The Leadership Difference. Tom Peters and 
Nancy Austin (1985) quote Max DePree of Herman Miller, 
The common wisdom is that American managers have to 
learn to motivate people. Nonsense. Employees bring 
their own motivation. What people need from work is to 
be liberated, to be involved, to be accountable, and to 
reach for their potential, (p. 239) 
DePree (1989) advocates adherence to "a person's Bill 
of Rights" which include: 
the right to be needed, the right to understand, the 
right to be involved, the right to a covenantal 
relationship [with the company], the right to affect 
one's own destiny, the right to be accountable, and the 
right to appeal. (p. 239) 
Whether approached as rights or needs, there is a 
recognition that: 
concepts of job structures that were appropriate to 
first-generation immigrants resulted in resentment and 
low productivity and sloppy workmanship when applied to 
their grandchildren. (Hudson, Miller and Suojanen, 
1975, p. 6) 
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Historical Perspective For Worker Needs 
Industrialization emerged in the nineteenth century in 
Western Europe. It is here that the world of work was 
permanently changed. Heisler and Houck (1977) cite the 
description of Marx and Engles1 Communist Manifesto (1948) 
with slight modification to describe the period: 
The bourgeoisie (industrialists), during its 
rule of scarcely one hundred years, has created 
more massive and more colossal productive forces 
than have all preceding generations together. The 
subjection of nature's forces to man and 
machinery; the application of chemistry to 
industry and agriculture; (the development of) 
steam navigation, railways and electric 
telegraphs; the clearing of whole continents for 
cultivation; the canalization of rivers and the 
conjuring of whole populations out of the ground 
(off the land?)- what earlier century had even a 
prentiment than such productive forces slumbered...? 
(Essential Works of Marxism, p. 17) 
As he examined the cause of the noticeable increase in 
wealth in countries such as England, France, and Poland 
during the eighteenth century, Adam Smith (1937) was one of 
the first to remark on the impact of division of labor on 
the personality of the workman. 
In the progress of the division of labour, the 
employment of the far greater part of those who 
live by labour, that is, of the great body of 
people, comes to be confined to a few very 
simple operations, frequently to one or two. But 
the understandings of the greater part of men are 
necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The 
man whose life is spent in performing a few 
simple operations has no occasion to exert his 
understanding... He naturally loses, therefore, 
the habit of exertion and generally becomes as 
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stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human 
creature to become. The torpor of his mind 
renders him, not only incapable of relishing or 
bearing a part in any rational conversation but of 
conceiving any generous, noble, or tender 
sentiment, and consequently of forming any just 
judgment concerning many even of the ordinary 
duties of private life... It corrupts even the 
activity of his body, and renders him incapable of 
exerting his strength with vigour and 
perseverance, in any other employment than that to 
which he has been lured. (cited in Heisler & 
Houck, 1977, p. 65) 
Marx (1959) also wrote of the alienating conditions of 
the industrial age. He was disturbed by the elimination of 
creativity in the workplace. Creativity, according to Marx, 
was necessary to distinguish man from animal. 
But an animal only produces what it immediately needs 
for itself or its young. It produces onesidedly, 
whilst man produces universal. It produces only under 
the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man 
produces even when he is free from physical need and 
only truly produces in freedom and there from. An 
animal produces only itself, whilst man produces the 
whole of nature. (cited in Heisler & Houck, 1977, 
P- 75) 
The Industrial Age continued with the twentieth 
century. New organizational problems developed as 
organizations grew. A premium was placed on productivity 
and efficiency. Management was traditionally based in the 
authoritarian system. Theory X beliefs that people were 
lazy and irresponsible and had to be closely supervised 
dominated the work place. Management was guided by two 
basic principles: (a) Each subordinate had one clearly 
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defined superior from whom he received orders and (b) all 
orders must be obeyed without question (Hudson, Miller, and 
Suojanen, 1975, p. 4). 
Power was coercive and focused on the needs of the 
worker as an economic man. Management held the ultimate 
power- to hire or fire. Management found goals more easily 
attained by manipulating the economic needs of its workers, 
thus wages and benefits became accepted as the most 
significant motivational factor. 
Traditional management was combined with 
interchangeable parts with specialization of labor when 
Henry Ford introduced mass production in 1913. The worker 
continued to be viewed as a 
poorly designed multipurpose machine tool motivated by 
lower level biological and safety needs, and completely 
standardized as to ability, strength, and perseverance. 
(Hudson, Miller and Suojanen, 1975, p. 5) 
The work environment continued to be characterized by 
simplified job content, close control by management and 
staff, and repetitive body actions determined in advance by 
motion and time studies. Industrial and production 
engineers designed assembly systems and managers took care 
of exceptions which occurred. 
In 1910 Fredrick Taylor introduced scientific or task 
management. According to Taylor (1911): 
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Perhaps the most prominent single element in modern 
scientific management is the task idea. The work of 
every workman is fully planned out by the management at 
least one day in advance, and each man receives in most 
cases complete written instructions, describing in 
detail the task which he is to accomplish, as well as 
the means to be used in doing the work... This task 
specifies not only what is to be done but how it is to 
be done, and the time allowed for doing it. (cited in 
Heisler & Houck, 1977, p. 66) 
The core of Taylor's approach was that there was one best 
method for doing each task. This right method could be 
determined through scientific investigation. Once the 
method was determined, the exact amount of time that it 
should take a worker to perform his function could be 
determined. Under the scientific approach, management 
scientifically selected workers, rather than permitting the 
workmen to select their own work. Management assumed 
responsibility for the "methods, implements, speed, and 
harmonious cooperation" (Hudson, Miller, and Suojanen, 
1975, p. 5). 
Taylor promoted Scientific Management as the optimal 
planning and control system for the Industrial Age. The 
system was founded upon the premise that industrial workers 
were motivated by fear of hunger and deprivation, and would 
do anything to avoid those undesirable conditions. 
A worker will strive to make as much money as possible, 
although limitations of time, capacity and ability will 
ultimately control how much he can earn. (Hudson, 
Miller and Suojanen, 1975, p. 5) 
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Although directed toward a redesign for overcoming 
human limitations, Taylor's research into design of work 
resulted in numerous improvements in the physical layout of 
industries. His idea concerning human behavior perpetuated 
the misconceptions of the traditional theory of management. 
The existence of self-motivation was completely denied in 
the work environment. 
The major shortcomings of the functional theory became 
apparent as a result of the Western Electric Company studies 
of its Hawthorne Plant. The Hawthorne plant attempted to 
increase productivity by improving the economic rewards 
available to the workers. Researchers found no apparent 
relationship between productivity and economic incentives or 
work design. The concept of "social man" emerged- one who 
seeks satisfaction through membership in a stable group and 
interacts meaningfully with fellow workers. The fact that 
certain needs were satisfied within the job environment 
demonstrated the importance of the informal organization. 
The quality of the work life became an important concern for 
management. 
Management theories founded in Theory Y- "People are 
able and responsible"- began to emerge. Job enrichment, 
organizational development, participative management, and 
sociotechnical systems developed as means for restoring some 
of the human value lost in the effort to achieve efficiency 
by oversimplifying work and oversupervising the employee. 
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Thrift, hard work, and a capacity for deferring 
gratification historically were traits widely 
distributed among Americans. Moreover as a part of the 
legitimacy of the economic system, individual members 
of our society were to be credited or blamed for their 
own circumstances, according to the degree of their 
prosperity. (Work In America, cited in Haas, 1975, 
p. 123) 
Motivation was bound in the work ethic. As people began to 
abandon the old work ethic in favor of self-fulfillment, 
management was challenged to structure a more conducive work 
environment. 
According to Haas (1975) the key factor in job 
satisfaction seems to be personal motivation. Despite equal 
pay and good working environments, there are happy and 
dissatisfied businessmen, doctors, plumbers, and serving 
machine operators. Although commitment appears to be 
facilitated by proper recognition, nothing works without 
personal motivation. 
In the 1950*s three specific theories of motivation 
were formulated. Although their validity is currently 
questioned, they remain the most widely known theories for 
employee motivation and provide the basis for contemporary 
theories. These are: Theory X and Y, the hierarchy of 
needs, and the motivation-hygiene theory. 
A well known theory of motivation is Maslow's 
hierarchy of needs. Maslow (1954) hypothesized that within 
every human being there exists a hierarchy of five needs. 
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These needs are: 
1. Physiological- includes hunger, thirst, 
shelter, sex and other bodily needs. 
2. Safety- includes security and protection 
from physical and emotional harm. 
3. Social- includes affection, a sense of 
belonging, acceptance, and friendship. 
4. Esteem- includes internal factors such as 
self-respect, autonomy, and achievement; 
and external factors such as status, 
recognition and attention. 
5. Self-actualization- the drive to become 
what one is capable of becoming; includes 
growth, achieving one's potential, and 
self-fulfillment. (Robbins, 1988, p. 29) 
With the satisfaction of a need, moving up the 
hierarchy from physiological to self-actualization, the next 
need becomes dominant. According to Maslow's theory, people 
malfunction vhen they can not meet their needs through 
constructive and socially acceptable behavior. 
Maslow argued that motivation is an internal drive 
which prompts an individual to take some kind of action. In 
other words, motivation is a self-applied stimulation to 
satisfy a need. Although no need is ever completely 
satiated, Maslow's theory would assume that a substantially 
satisfied need ceases to motivate. Prior to Maslow, 
motivation was generally considered to be something that one 
person did to another in the form of behavior modification. 
Although widely used and accepted by practicing 
managers, research generally does not validate the theory. 
There is little substantive evidence to indicate that 
following the theory will lead to a more motivated work 
place (Robbins, 1988, p. 11). 
McGregor (1960) proposed two views of human beings 
relative to management: Theory X and Theory Y. He 
concluded that a manager's basic assumptions about the 
nature of human beings molds his or her behavior toward 
subordinates. 
Theory X is defined by four basic assumptions: 
1. Employees inherently dislike work and, 
whenever possible, will attempt to avoid it. 
2. Since employees dislike work, they must 
be coerced, controlled or threatened with 
punishment to achieve desired goals. 
3. Employees will shirk responsibilities and seek 
formal direction whenever possible. 
4. Most workers place security above all 
other factors associated with work, and 
will display little ambition. (Robbins, 1988, 
p. 30) 
Theory Y, on the other hand, is based upon four 
positive assumptions about the nature of humans: 
1. Employees can view work as being as natural 
as rest or play. 
2. A person will exercise self-direction and 
self-control if he is committed to the objectives 
3. The average person can learn to accept, even 
seek, responsibility. 
4. Creativity, that is, the ability to make good 
decisions, is widely dispersed throughout the 
population, and not necessarily the sole 
province of those in management functions. 
(Robbins, 1988, p. 30) 
The third theory, the motivation-hygiene theory, was 
proposed by Herzberg (1957). Believing that an individual 
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relation to his work is a basic one and that his attitude 
toward work is a strong determinant of success or failure, 
Herzberg investigated the question of what people want from 
their jobs. From the categorizing of factors that affected 
job attitudes, Herzberg concluded that certain personal 
characteristics tend to be consistently related to job 
satisfaction, and others to dissatisfaction. Intrinsic 
factors seem to be related to job satisfaction with the 
characteristics attributed to the worker. Extrinsic factors 
such as company policy and working conditions were cited 
relative to dissatisfaction. 
The data suggest that removing a dissatisfying 
characteristic from a job does not necessarily make the job 
satisfying according to Herzberg. Therefore, managers who 
seek to eliminate factors that create job dissatisfaction 
may be placating their workforce rather than motivating 
them. Herzberg advocates an emphasis on achievement, 
recognition, the work itself, responsibility and growth. 
Several contemporary theories of motivation have 
evolved. The goal theory identifies three major relevant 
motives or needs in the workplace (McClelland, 1961, 1975; 
Atkinson & Raynor, 1974). 
1. The need for achievement- the drive to excel, 
to achieve in relation to a set of standards, to strive to 
succeed. 
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2. The need for power- the need to make others 
behave in a way that they would not have behaved otherwise. 
3. The need for affiliation- the desire for friendly 
and close interpersonal relationships. 
Considerable evidence also supports the theory that 
goals can be a major source of work motivation. Specific 
goals lead to increased performance and difficult goals, 
when accepted, result in higher performance than simple 
goals (Napier and Gershenfeld, 1989). 
A process theory of motivation is Skinner's behavior 
modification. Skinner's theory deals with modifying 
external factors. Behavior can be modified by 
reinforcement, either positive or negative. Positive 
reinforcement is more effective in achieving lasting results 
when it closely follows the behavior to be modified. 
Vroom and Yetton (1973) present the expectancy theory as the 
most comprehensive contemporary explanation of motivation. 
According to this theory, the higher the strength of an 
expectation that the act will be followed by a given 
outcome, and on the attractiveness of that outcome to the 
individual, the stronger the tendency to act in a certain 
way. An important contribution of the expectancy theory is 
the emphasis on perception and beliefs of people. The 
perception that motivation exists must be shared between 
employee and manager or it does not exist. Expectancy 
theory implies that different people value different rewards 
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and that a single incentive is unlikely to motivate 
everyone. An important message for managers in expectancy 
theory is that employees must have confidence in their 
ability to successfully accomplish a task. 
There appears to be little debate on the need to create 
a positive working environment or climate- one that 
encourages and receives optimum effort and quality from 
those involved. This environment fosters commitment 
through shared vision and goals which do not negate the 
importance of the individual. According to, Gerber (1985) 
...what people need, then, is a place of 
community that has purpose, order, and meaning. A 
place in which being human is a pre-requisite, but 
acting human is essential. A place where the 
generally disorganized thinking that pervades our 
culture becomes organized and clearly focused on a 
specific worthwhile result. A place where 
discipline and will become prized for what they 
are: the backbone of enterprise and action, of being 
what you are intentionally instead of accidentally. A 
place that replaces the home most of us have lost, 
(p. 127) 
Garfield (1986) calls for the work environment to be 
that place we might call a zone of peak performance, 
where he (the worker) can align his personal mission 
with the specific demands of a job and the overall 
environment and objectives of an organization, 
(p. 278) 
The environments described by Garfield and Gerber are 
polar to the description of the alienated workers Marx 
(1844) described where: 
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labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not 
belong to his essential being... the worker is at home 
(with all that term connotes in the way of 
psychological and biological rewards and supports) when 
he is not working, and when he is working he is not at 
home, (cited in Garfield, 1986, p. 72) 
DePree (1989) contends that workers need to understand 
and be "at home" in their working environment- both the 
human environment and the physical environment. 
There needs to be a visible order and a 'sense of 
place' so we may know who we are and where we fit. Our 
environments should have a human scale and we have a 
right to beauty, (p. 34) 
Consideration of the visible order and beauty leads one 
to examine the physical aspects of the positive environment. 
Herzberg (1957) used the factor "working conditions" to 
include the physical aspects of the working environment 
which are not necessarily a part of the work. He considered 
the factors more a function of the particular organization 
or company. The specific aspects included: 
1. attractive surroundings 
2. clean and orderly workplace 
3. adequacy and condition of equipment, 
supplies, and tools 
4. lighting 
5. temperature and ventilation 
6. absence of smoke, noise, excessive heat, odors 
7. safety conditions 
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8. music 
9. recreational, food facilities 
10. medical facilities 
11. parking facilities 
12. geographical location and community 
13. hours 
Herzberg concluded that the worker accepts working 
conditions as a standard part of the job with less thought 
to their importance than for other job factors. Working 
conditions were found to have an equally low contribution to 
both satisfaction and dissatisfaction (p. 74). These 
findings would support DePree (1989) who believes that while 
the physical environment matters a great deal, it is not as 
important as the management environment. 
The physical environment is likely to be a consequence 
of certain elements of the management environment. In 
that sense the facility will reflect the context of a 
corporation, its leadership, and its values, (p. Ill) 
DePree encourages leaders to strive to create an 
environment that: 
1. encourages an open community and fortuitous 
encounter 
2. welcomes all 
3. is kind to the user 
4. changes with grace 
5. is person scaled 
6. is subservient to human activity 
7. forgives mistakes in planning 
8. enables this community (in the sense that an 
environment can) to reach continually toward its 
potential 
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9. is a contribution to the landscape as an 
aesthetic and human values 
10. meets the needs we can perceive 
11. is open to surprise 
12. is comfortable with conflict 
13. has flexibility, is nonprecious and 
nonmonumenta1 (p. 113) 
Herzberg states that employers frequently underestimate 
the importance of intrinsic job aspects which include 
opportunity, pride, accomplishment, challenge, 
responsibility, and service to the company, among others. 
These intrinsic factors are closely related to Maslow's 
fourth and fifth levels of esteem and self-actualization and 
value the individual. In an environment which values the 
intrinsic, individual diversity is recognized. The need for 
opportunity, equity and identity in the workplace is 
understood. Employees, in recognizing diversity, are 
provided the chance to obtain meaning, fulfillment, and 
purpose on the job and not solely in private life. Work 
becomes increasingly more routinized and monotonous for 
workers in environments which require limited utilization of 
their abilities. Workers become increasingly repressed, 
inhibited, and frustrated as they find themselves 
increasingly unable to satisfy needs through their work. 
Undesirable activities result in the form of absenteeism, 
low productivity, and poor workmanship. 
Conversely, positive working environments offer 
opportunities to use and develop human capacities. 
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The objective is to involve the workers in a 
wholehearted program with the immediate objective of 
improving the quality of worklife at the operating 
level of the organization. The general thrust is to 
provide workers more autonomy and greater control over 
their working activity. (Hudson, Miller, Suojanen, 
p. 12) 
DePree (1989) encourages participative management which 
enables the expression of diverse gifts of persons with an 
emphasis on creativity and on the quality of the process. 
"It fuels the generation of ideas, the solving of problems, 
and the managing of change and conflict" (p. 77). 
Garfield (1986) contends that a positive work 
environment offers a place where the worker's mission has 
its best chance to succeed- where he/she can see concrete 
results emerging from what he/she does. 
When I am in my own place to stand, I am not getting in 
my own way, selling myself, short, or giving in to the 
many short cuttings of values and outcomes that life 
presents as options. I have chosen what is best for 
those with whom I work and live. I feel strong, 
physically, emotionally, and intellectually, because my 
place to stand allows me to perform and contribute at 
my best. (p. 279) 
Positive working environments encourage loyalty. The 
desire to be loyal and to receive loyalty is natural. A 
sense of loyalty is part of one1s self image as an essential 
element of the worker's need to belong. 
If a person is betrayed, a sense of helplessness is 
created... You don't build a powerful, effective 
society with defeated, despairing people. (Shea, 1987, 
p. 30) 
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Shea (1987) contends that managers and executives need 
to know how to build a culture and environment that fosters 
loyalty in the workplace. 
Companies loyal to their employees use lay-offs only as 
a last resort, provide for basic employee needs, and 
help with their problems to the greatest extent 
practical. Companies who are callous to these needs 
tend to have high turnover rates, a poor public image, 
labor troubles, poor quality products or services, and 
numerous, lately, lawsuits. They tend to have a hard 
time attracting suitable workers after a layoff and 
often find that the low productivity that follows 
layoffs may lead to more layoffs, (p. 31) 
It is essential that the positive environment recognize 
the social man. Formal and informal work groups not only 
provide the primary mechanism for the attainment of 
organizational goals, but also allow workers to satisfy 
social needs, such as emotional support, which cannot be 
supplied by the larger organization. 
Most writers distinguish between formal or informal 
groups although there are many types of work groups (Shaw, 
1976). Formal groups are defined by the structure of the 
organization with designated work assignments establishing 
task and work groups. Desired behaviors are stipulated by 
and directed toward organizational goals. Conversely, 
informal groups emerge naturally from the need for social 
contact and the interaction of the group members. These 
groups are neither structured nor organizationally 
determined. For both formal and informal groups, proximity 
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and contact are prerequisites for group formation. People 
have an opportunity to get to know each other and to 
determine if the basis for a positive relationship exists. 
Formal and informal groups can each be subclassified 
into two groups. Command and task groups are dictated by 
the formal organization. Interest and friendship groups 
emerge informally. Command groups, also called functional 
groups, are composed of the supervisor and his/her immediate 
subordinates. The organization dictates the goals, 
interdependencies, interactions, and performance levels of 
command groups. Task groups, also organizationally 
determined, represent those who come together for the 
purpose of accomplishing a specified task. The situation 
requires members to communicate, interact, and to coordinate 
activities if the purpose of the group is to be 
accomplished. 
Informal groups may be subclassified as interest or 
friendship groups. An interest group is formed when 
individuals who may or may not be aligned into common 
command or task groups affiliate to obtain a specific 
objective with which each is concerned. Such groups usually 
exist until their purpose has been accomplished. Some 
develop long-term relationships, such as in the case of 
unions, and become incorporated into the formal 
organizational framework. Friendship groups, based upon 
shared characteristics, develop as a result of opportunity 
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and desire and satisfy members' social needs. The 
organization does not closely control the membership and 
composition patterns of interest and friendship groups. 
Problems may develop for organizational leaders when the 
goals of these informal groups are incongruent with the 
goals of the organization. 
The principal reasons people join groups are for the 
organizational purposes of goal attainment or for 
satisfaction of individual needs. Different groups provide 
different benefits to their members. 
Expectations, how an individual anticipates that events 
will occur, is an important consideration for leaders 
considering group behavior. Three sets of expectations are 
important to examine. 
1. The expectation that individuals have for the 
ability to do a competent job and to perform 
well. 
2. The expectation the individual has for his or 
her group, including the degree of 
participation by other members, interpersonal 
relationships, and rewards for good performance. 
3. The expectation the group has for the 
individual's contribution to group activity and 
eventual goal accomplishment. (Szilagyi and 
Wallace, p. 205) 
External or situational factors under which the group 
functions also impact group performance. The organization 
can control some of these factors such as group size, social 
density, the type of task, and group composition. Research 
indicates that under certain conditions each of these 
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factors contributes to group performance levels. The 
research conducted by Bales (1950) indicates that very small 
groups show more tension, agreement and asking of opinions, 
while larger groups show more tension release and giving of 
information. Groups with an even number of members have a 
greater difficulty obtaining a majority and members in 
smaller groups report greater satisfaction (cited in Slater, 
1970). Replications of Ringlemann's research in the 1920's 
on group size indicate that increases in group size are 
inversely related to individual performance (Robbins, 1988) . 
Although these situational factors are important, it appears 
that the nature of the task is the most important 
consideration to the success of group development. 
Some form of structure for group activity develops over 
a period of time within any group in an organization. Group 
structure may be viewed as the framework or pattern of 
relationships among members that assists the group in 
working toward its goal (Szilagyi and Wallace, 1980). The 
concepts of roles, norms, and status underlie a basic 
understanding of group structure. 
Each individual in a group is expected to behave in 
certain ways by superiors, subordinates, and peers. Role is 
defined as a set of expected behavior patterns attributed to 
someone occupying a given position in a social unit 
(Robbins, 1988). This behavior or expected role may be 
specified by a number of means including job descriptions 
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and position titles. In addition to expected roles, there 
are also perceived and enacted roles. The set of activities 
or behaviors in the group that an individual believes he/she 
should do is the perceived role. The enacted role is the 
way that the individual group member actually behaves. 
When differences exist among the expected, perceived, 
and enacted roles, the probability of role stress, conflict, 
and negative effects on performance increases. Role 
ambiguity and role conflict result. Role ambiguity is the 
lack of clarity regarding job duties, authority, and 
responsibility that the individual perceives in his or her 
role. Role conflict occurs when multiple demands and 
directions which come from one or more individuals creates 
uncertainties in a member's mind concerning what should be 
done, when, or for whom. Continuing high levels of role 
ambiguity and/or role conflict can result in decreased group 
performance. Szilagyi and Wallace (1980) describe two 
possible responses. First, the individual can maintain a 
status position or unless the situation can be controlled, 
resign or selectively withdraw from group activities and 
interactions. Second, attempts may be made to modify the 
demands placed upon the individual. 
All groups have established acceptable standards of 
behavior that are shared by the group members. The primary 
purpose of these standards or norms is to place some 
boundaries on the behaviors of group members in order to 
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insure that group performance will be maintained. The role 
that norms play in influencing worker behavior was not fully 
recognized until the Hawthorne studies were conducted in the 
1930's under the direction of Mayo. The studies concluded 
that a worker's behavior and sentiments were closely 
related, that group standards were highly effective in 
establishing individual worker output, and that money was 
less a factor in determining worker output than group 
standards, sentiments, and security (Robbins, 1988). 
Norms typically develop gradually in one of four ways. 
First, explicit statements are made by group members-
usual ly the group leader. Second, critical events in the 
group's history set precedents. Third, primary or initial 
behavior problems set group expectations. The fourth 
develops from carry-over behaviors from past situations. 
Norms are not enforced for every situation. Those that are 
enforced are those that facilitate the group's survival, 
increase the predictability of group members' behaviors, 
reduce embarrassing interpersonal problems for group 
members, and allow members to express central values of the 
group and clarify what is distinctive about the group's 
identity (Robbins, 1988). According to Dessler (1987), some 
managers have learned that they cannot only ask, "Does the 
employee know what is expected of him?" Instead they must 
also ask, "Does the employee's work group have its own 
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production norms, and do these disagree with mine?" 
(p. 266). 
Status systems result from prestige grading, position, 
or rank within a group. Status may be formally imposed 
through the organization or through titles. Status is 
informally acquired by such characteristics as education, 
age, sex, skill, or experience. 
Where groups are made up of heterogeneous individuals 
or where heterogeneous groups are forced to be 
interdependent, there is a potential for status 
differences to initiate conflict as the group attempts 
to reconcile and align the differing hierarchies 
(Robbins, 1988 p. 88). 
The more that group members are attracted to one 
another and the more the group's goals align with individual 
goals, the greater the group's cohesiveness. This 
cohesiveness consists of the characteristics of the group in 
which the factors acting on the group members to remain and 
participate are greater than those acting on members to 
leave it. Szilagyi and Wallace (1980) identify five factors 
which increase group cohesiveness and five factors that 
decrease group cohesiveness. Those that increase 
effectiveness are: (a) agreement of group goals, (b) 
frequency of interaction, (c) personal attractiveness, (d) 
intergroup competition, (e) favorable evaluation. Those 
that decrease cohesiveness are: (a) disagreement on 
group goals, (b) group size, (c) unpleasant experiences 
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with the group, (d) intragroup competition, (e) domination 
by one individual. 
Studies of group cohesiveness suggest that cohesive 
groups can formulate performance goals and norms that 
exceed, meet, or are below management expectations. Groups 
performing below organizationally accepted norms require 
some form of managerial intervention because conformity to 
group norms is a key characteristic of cohesive groups 
(Szilagyi and Wallace, 1980) . 
Instruments have been developed for the purpose of 
measuring the work environment. Ginsberg (1982) describes 
the major topics to be considered. 
(1) Corporate Goals and Missions. Do employees see 
purpose, direction, planning, and risk taking in the 
operation? 
(2) Organization. Are roles defined and limits of 
authority understood? Do employees understand 
department/function interrelationships as well as 
their own involvement in the company? 
(3) Climate for Growth. Do employees view the 
organization as open, trusting, flexible, and 
cooperative? Is there growth and opportunity 
for advancement? 
(4) Management Style. How do employees describe and 
evaluate the leadership style? 
(5) Communication. Do employees perceive a two-way 
flow of information. Do they feel a sense of 
awareness and candor in this exchange? 
(6) Reward System. Do employees regard the reward 
system as competitive, equitable, and tied to 
performance, (p. 60) 
Peters and Austin (1985) cite examples of leaders in 
industry. Tom Monaghan, of Domino's Pizza says, "Pay 
attention to the Golden Rule, and the world is yours." Bill 
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and Vieve Gore of W.L. Gore and Associates apply four 
principles: 
fairness, which controls destructive dissensions; 
freedom, which allows associates to experience failure; 
commitment, the power behind the desire to succeed; and 
'waterline' or discretion , which reduces the chances 
for behavior that could damage the company's reputation 
and profitability, (p. 240) 
Treybig's philosophy at IBM is that (a) all people are 
good; (b) people, workers, management, and company are all 
the same thing; (c) every single person in the company must 
understand the essence of the business; (d) every employee 
'must benefit from the company's success; and (e) you must 
create an environment where all the above can happen (cited 
in Peters & Austin, 1985). 
Positive work environments require leaders who believe 
that businesses can become a place of community. 
It can become that place where words such as integrity, 
intention, commitment, vision, and excellence can be 
used, not as nouns, but as verbs, as action steps in 
the process of producing a worthwhile result. (Gerber, 
p. 127) 
Creating work environments which are positive is a process 
reflecting the context of a positive corporation and 
positive leadership which values people. 
A perceived major threat to worker security is the fear 
of losing employment as a result of changes in the 
organization related to an acquisition or merger (Korn-Ferry 
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cited in Kanter, 1989). Mergers and acquisitions are major 
catalysts for organizational change creating challenges for 
those who are responsible for creating a new positive work 
environment. It is estimated that approximately a quarter 
of a million employees' lives were changed as a result of 
the ten largest mergers and acquisitions that occurred in 
1983 (Pritchett, 1985). Ten percent of the work force, 
which represents approximately 12 million people, are 
estimated to have been involved in a merger or acquisition 
related to downsizing or divestitures (Kay, 1987). Kanter 
(1989) writes that these changes can reverberate in negative 
ways, causing career dislocation, diminished personal 
expectations, and disrupted family lives (p. 13). 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Accurate statistics regarding mergers and acquisitions 
in the United States are not available. Approximately 60% 
of all merger activity is never publicized or consists of 
small transactions (less than million dollar deals) that no 
one tracks systematically (McCann & Gilkey, 1988). 
No complete data series exists on mergers and 
acquisitions in the economy. All of the series have lower 
limits. Yearly comparisons of existing data series also 
yield inaccurate results. Fixed dollar lower limits in 
times of inflation artificially increase the number of 
transactions over time (McCann and Gilkey, 1988). 
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Three basic sources of time-series data on mergers and 
acquisitions for the postwar period are the United States 
Federal Trade Commission, the periodical Mergers and 
Acquisitions, and the annual reports of W.T. Grimm and 
Company. The major source of data for the period 1895-1920 
is the study conducted by Ralph Nelson (1959) covering only 
the manufacturing and mining sectors. Cut off limits are 
not explicit and rely on financial reporting for the 
period (cited in McCann and Gilkey, 1988). 
Historical perspectives, though limited, are necessary 
to the understanding of the current trend of mergers and 
acquisitions. McCann and Gilkey (1985) use the four waves 
of activity described by Davidson (1985) to outline activity 
since the 1880's. 
Labeled horizontal integration, firms grew by expanding 
manufacturing capacity at the turn of the century. The 
merger or acquisition of a similar organization became the 
dominant corporate strategy to expand the capacity and 
geographical base. The strong economy fueled mergers and 
acquisitions. Parallel stock market growth helped to float 
shares of the new organization form- the publicly held 
corporation. Activity was dampened between 1910 and 1920 
with antitrust legislation and a downturn in the economy. 
Some firms still grow by horizontal integration where 
industry concentration is not great such as the airline 
industry (US Air and Piedmont) and the goods industry (R J 
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Reynolds and Nabisco Brands). The general trend, however, 
was redirected in the 1920's. 
Vertical integration dominated the second wave of 
acquisitions and mergers. This appeared to be driven by the 
desire to create economies of scale. "Downstream" 
customers or outlets for products and "upstream" suppliers 
of raw resources and component parts were acquired. 
Reducing operating costs to maintain profit margin replaced 
expanding capacity as the driving force. Despite the major 
antitrust measures enacted during this period, the largest 
industrial enterprises in the country were built through 
vertical integration- General Motors, U.S. Steel, and 
Standard Oil. 
McCann and Gilkey (1988) describe the period of 
vertical integration as a "period of major organizational 
and management innovations" (p. 21). Management became more 
professionalized with better qualified managers running 
operations using more advanced methods. Organizational 
structures were evolving to allow widespread operations to 
run more effectively. Top management was free to plot 
additional mergers and acquisitions. Merger and 
acquisition activity was again rechanneled when the crash of 
1929 spawned new legal and regulatory restraints. 
The third wave, conglomeration, was driven by the need 
to bypass regulatory constraints. Theoretically, mergers 
and acquisitions were to stabilize financial performances by 
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buying diverse firms. Mergers and acquisitions were used 
almost exclusively as the strategy to build earnings. This 
represented the first time a candidate company's financial 
attributes dominated marketing and production 
considerations. Candidate firms were screened for the 
ability to carry greater debt and to generate 
sufficient cash to fuel additional acquisitions and to boost 
stock market performance. 
Many reasons were offered for the unrelated 
diversification from the traditional core businesses. The 
reasons were illfounded (Chandler, 1977). The idea that 
countercyclical acquisitions would stabilize earnings was 
disproven in the deep economic recession of the 1970's. 
Faltering financial performance, higher interest rates, 
dried up sources of capital such as the stock market and 
cheap long-term debt precipitated the redirection to the 
fourth and current wave. 
Mergers and acquisitions in recent years have been 
driven by the need to rationalize the binge of the previous 
years. More rigorous principles are being brought into the 
merger and acquisition process. Divestitures increased 
during the late 1970's and early 1980's spurred by 
debilitating debts in some instances and restructuring for 
increased capital in others. Beatrice, for example, is 
reported to have earned two hundred and twenty million 
dollars from the sale of unrelated businesses (McCann, 
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Gilkey, p. 22). Most divestitures create corresponding 
acquisition-mergers. Creative alternatives such as 
leverage-buyouts and going public with divestitures prevent 
a one to one relationship between divestitures and mergers 
and acquisitions. 
The restructuring through divestitures is restoring 
order to the chaos of earlier activity. Many who led the 
conglomerate movement have passed control to others who must 
disseminate their earlier creations. 
Davidson calls the fourth wave of activity the "mega-
merger wave" because of the large number of large 
mergers and acquisitions involved. McCann and Gilkey (1988) 
look beyond the magnitude of the activity, referring to this 
as industry transformation. It is characterized by the 
wrenching effects of "mega deals" on energy and capital, 
increasing foreign competition, rapidly changing technology, 
and the maturing of many industries (Business Week, 1981). 
As firms begin reacting to rapid technological change, 
they are looking for new technologies to help reduce 
costs, improve productivity, and introduce new products 
into new markets. As our economy shifts toward 
services and away from 'smokestack* industries, as 
firms may try to abandon its traditional business and 
enter new ones. History's largest wave of corporate 
restructuring is still underway, and its full 
implications still are not clear. They are certainly 
not all positive, judging from the number of lay offs, 
closed plants, and deep rifts in the basic commitment 
of workers and companies to each other. (McCann and 
Gilkey, 1984, pp. 24-25) 
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Gaining entry into new technologies is a major driving 
force behind many recent acquisitions and mergers by large 
firms. Small technology firms can raise capital and secure 
early markets by forming strategic alliances with much 
larger firms. 
Eight reasons are used to justify mergers and 
acquisitions (McCann and Gilkey, 1984). 
1. Risk reduction and diversification; 
2. Competitive reaction; 
3. Perception of underutilized or undervalued assets; 
4. Anticipated synergies in markets, 
finances, operations or human resources; 
5. Legal and tax benefits; 
6. Access to new technologies or processes; 
7. Ego-emotional or psychological motivation; 
8. "Idle cash." 
The acquiring corporation prepares for the merger or 
acquisition by identifying the acquisition strategy and 
screening criteria, selecting the screening approach, making 
the acquisition, and planning the post acquisition 
integration process (Morse, et al., 1987). 
Five rules, according to Drucker (1981), have been 
followed in successful acquisitions since the time of J.P. 
Morgan. 
1. Acquire a company with a 'common core of unity'-
either common technology or markets or in some 
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situation production processes. Financial ties 
alone are insufficient. 
2. Think through your firm's potential 
contributions of skills to the acquired company. 
There must be a contribution and it has to be more 
than money. 
3. Respect the products, markets and customers of 
the acquired company. There must be a 
'temperamental fit. 1 
4. Within approximately a year, you must be prepared 
to provide top management for the acquired company. 
5. Within the first year of the merger, a large number 
of managers of both companies should receive 
substantial promotions from one of the former 
companies to the other, (p. 3) 
These rules are included here because of their wide use 
in related prescriptive literature. Paine and Power (1984) 
dispute the rules based on their literature and empirical 
research stating 
following Drucker's rules probably does not 
significantly reduce risks and following them may 
create longrun competitive problems, (p. 44) 
More empirical research is suggested to examine the nature 
and reasons for acquisition success. 
The focus on the human, organizational and managerial 
aspects of mergers and acquisitions has slowly developed. 
However, there has been relatively little systematic study 
of such phenomena. Marks (1982) divides the available 
research on human and organizational responses to corporate 
merger into four categories: (1) prescriptive articles, (2) 
surveys, (3) case studies, and (4) studies of 
"quasi-mergers." 
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The success of mergers and acquisitions appears to 
depend upon many variables. Yunker (1983) suggests that 
most of the problems which adversely affect the performance 
of a merged firm are internally generated by the acquirer 
and by the dynamics of the new entity. The integration 
strategies are apparently crucial to reduce the job 
insecurity that may harm individuals and the acquired 
companies (Paine, Power, 1984). 
McCann and Gilkey (1984) report that there was almost 
perfect consensus among, the professionals and executives 
contacted that the time from the agreement's negotiation to 
the smooth functioning of the two firms is turbulent and 
full of risk. "This transition planning and management is 
essential to the merger's success" (p. 10). 
The first major study of the acquisition decision 
process was conducted by Mace and Montgomery (1962). From 
unstructured field interviews with 275 executives in 75 
United States firms, the researchers concluded that general 
managers must recognize and have the necessary skills to 
deal with the different requirements for success in 
different industries (cited in Marks, 1982). Research By 
Salter and Weinhold (1979) supported these findings. 
Ansoff, et al., (1971) collected retrospective data 
about the performance of 93 companies. Planning was found 
to be important to successful acquisitions and corporate 
performance. The researchers prescribed that managers 
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carefully select and thoroughly evaluate a small number of 
alternative companies. Salter and Weinhold (1979) suggested 
that companies locate and purchase undervalued assets 
stressing a need to have excess cash. These researchers 
concluded that differing decision processes were necessary 
depending on whether it was a related or unrelated 
diversification. 
Hitching (1967) found research prior to his work to be 
"concentrated on the events leading up to and immediately 
following an acquisition" (p. 85). He summarized the causes 
of successes and failures finding that communication and 
support were the dominant themes in managing the people 
aspects. 
Buono and Bowditch (1989) also report finding research 
limited concerning the human dynamics involved in an 
acquisition or merger. They identify five areas that are 
less fully documented: 
(1) the dynamics and processes underlying mergers and 
acquisitions, 
(2) the attitudes and the perceptions of the merger 
partners regarding their old and new and newly 
formed organizations, 
(3) the processes through which these perceptions are 
formed, 
(4) the types of uncertainties and ambiguities involved 
in the transformation, 
(5) ways in which managers may facilitate the combining 
of different organizations, (p. 22) 
Organizational transformations have been criticized as 
being undermanaged at the human resource level (Kimberly and 
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Quinn, 1984). Two basic reasons were cited. First, 
managers prefer to focus on technical issues which tend to 
have concrete resolutions. Second, behavioral issues, such 
as beliefs values, attitudes, commitment, and communication 
needs, are difficult to measure in quantitative terms. 
Often they are dismissed as being irrelevant. Bice (1986) 
described this type of approach to organizational 
transformations as ineffective. 
Research underscores the need to consider the role of 
change in the integration process. According to Buono and 
Bowditch (1989), there must be widespread acceptance of the 
need for change at all levels of the hierarchy. Focused 
efforts and sensitivity to what people are experiencing is 
described as necessary to decrease the costs involved for 
both the individual and the company. 
Research suggests that the integration period generates 
stress (Schweiger and Ivancevich, 1985, cited in Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989,) which results in the "merger syndrome" 
described as a highly defensive, anxious response to the 
uncertainties involved (Marks and Mirvis,1986). 
Disagreement exists on what strategies facilitate the 
integration. Time is identified as a key factor by some 
researchers (Pritchett, 1985; Stybel, 1986). The research 
of Smith (1985) supports the need to postpone controversial 
changes, such as reorganizations, or relocations, while 
developing an understanding of systems, preparing people for 
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the changes, and carefully laying the foundation for 
projected changes. Yunker (1983) also advises firms to make 
changes gradually. He argues that as long as five years 
should be allowed for complete integration in areas such as 
personnel and benefits. Buono and Bowditch (1989) contend 
that trying to impose changes too quickly can generate 
resentment, dissatisfaction, and the loss of key personnel. 
However, employees expect change, according to these 
researchers, and conveying the expectation that little 
change will occur actually undermines credibility. 
Kubilus (1989) found that administrative areas need to 
be consolidated quickly but, as much as possible, things 
should remain unchanged in the acquired company. Companies 
who were reported to be managing relatively trouble-free 
mergers reported keeping management in place for a specified 
time offering incentives and building morale and 
psychological support. 
Others cite effective management as necessary where 
managers take an active role in directing the process. 
(Blumberg and Weiner, 1979; Gordon, 1982; Blake and Mouton, 
1985; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1987; Pritchett, 1985). 
According to Pappanastos, Hillman, and Cole (1987) 
combination related failures can be significantly reduced 
and the integration process expedited through an effective 
use of tension tools, techniques, and methods. 
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Most research literature on post-combination 
integrations tend to lack depth according to Buono and 
Bowditch (1989) offering simple prescriptions. 
Simple prescriptions to change the culture of the 
merger partner or acquisition target often ignore the 
length of time and inherent difficulties involved in 
culture change efforts. Advice to assure your 
employees rarely addresses the fragility of the trust 
that exists in merging or acquiring organizations. 
Recommendations to 'build relationships* typically 
oversimplify the range and depth of such interactions, 
(p. 195) 
An emergent theme in related research is the importance 
of communication. The lack of adequate, timely 
communication is often cited as a problem in the integration 
of mergers and acquisitions (Hayes, 1979; Marks, 1982; 
Bastien, 1987; Buono and Bowditch, 1988, 1989). Two types 
of communication cited as necessary are (a) to keep people 
informed about the merger or acquisition, its ramifications, 
and its implementation and (b) to facilitate getting the 
work done (American Bankers Association and Ernst and 
Whinney, 1985). 
The creation of formal internal communication channels 
as early as possible in the acquisition or merger process 
reduces anxieties which are fueled by rumors, internal 
sources, and new reports (Hayes, 1979; Marks, 1982; Kanter 
and Seggerman, 1986; Bastien, 1987; Pritchett, 1985; Lewis, 
1988; Buono and Bowditch, 1989). 
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Bastien (1987) warns that inaccurate information is 
worse than the absence of information. The congruence of 
communication with actual observed events is perceived to be 
indicative of the acquired firms values and commitments. 
Buono and Bowditch (1989) synthesize research to offer 
12 suggestions for early communication to clearly address 
issues and concerns: 
1. reasons underlying the merger or acquisition 
decision and what the combination will mean for 
both organizations and their members; 
2. general facts about and orientation to the merging 
or acquiring companies; 
3. changes in company name, structure, and management 
(chain of command); 
4. the elimination of or addition to any functions 
currently represented in the organization; 
5. the possibility of a reduction in force, how 
decisions will be made, and whether there will be 
outplacement assistance; 
6. detailed changes in compensation and benefit 
packages and management prerequisites (expense 
accounts, company cars); 
7. job-related changes including new roles and 
assignments; 
8. transfers to new job assignments or geographical 
areas; 
9. possible changes in career paths; 
10. changes in working relationships; 
11. how business will be conducted during the 
transition period; 
12. general changes in company policies (Barrett, 1973; 
Imberman, 1985; Ivancevich, Schweiger, and Power, 
1987, cited in Buono and Bowditch, 1989) 
A second issue related to the successful integration of 
acquisitions and mergers is the expectations of those 
involved. Firth (1976) and Goldberg (1983) found that 
precombination expectations of employees, managers, and 
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shareholders usually exceed actual results. Responses are 
characterized by performance declines, a slow learning 
process, and organizational dissatisfaction. Employees who 
are provided with a realistic merger preview maintain much 
more stable levels of commitment, satisfaction, trust, and 
performance (Schweiger and DeNisi, 1987). 
Realistic expectations resulting from adequate merger 
previews and early communication may decrease the perception 
of employee deprivation created when employees perceive that 
events are detrimental. Perceived employee deprivation 
generates discontent (Davis, 1959; Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 
1970; Cook, Crosby, and Hennigan, 1977; Crosby, 1982). Two 
discrepancies resulting in employee deprivation are (a) a 
discrepancy exists between actual and desired outcomes and 
(b) a discrepancy exists between actual and deserved 
outcomes. 
Morse, Feldman and Martin (1987) contend that in 
successful merger integrations, senior management stress the 
common good of the new organization to encourage an 
acceptance of the need for change at all levels of the 
hierarchy. 
The successful companies also shared a unique vision of 
the 'common good.1 They communicated the necessity for 
not putting 'our own' parochial interests first. The 
people involved in successful transitions recognized 
the chance to build a better organization than either 
constituent had enjoyed as a separate company. When 
that kind of thinking is introduced at the outset and 
maintained throughout the transition, the resulting 
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organization is far stronger than if the process is 
wracked by defensiveness, turf protection, and desires 
to retain the status quo. (p. 316) 
Perceived inequities in managing the new organization 
may fuel perceptions of employee deprivation. Most 
premerger statements and discussions about the integration 
of acquisitions and mergers emphasize the importance of 
participation in effecting organizational change. However, 
studies indicate that the process is usually tightly 
controlled by top management (Barmash, 1971; Sales and 
Mirvis, 1984; Buono, Bowditch and Lewis, 1988; Buono and 
Bowditch, 1989). 
Kanter and Seggerman (1986) describe the process as 
merger related strategies "done to rather than done by 
employees." Riggs (1958) suggested that 
when feasible, the newly acquired management should be 
given an equal voice in approving proposed changes, so 
that its own sense of recognition and responsibility 
can remain stable, (p. 217) 
The leaders of the integration must recognize that 
there are usually good managers in both organizations and 
change the assumption that only the acquiring management 
will manage the new entity. According to Morse, Feldman, 
and Martin (1987), "The 'winner gets the spoils' attitude is 
a short-sighted road to a crack up." They contend that 
"companies that care about the people element usually will 
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be more efficient, more productive, and more profitable" (p. 
323). Four characteristics of viable programs cited are: 
1. There is an emphasis on senior management 
visibility or actually getting executives in front 
of the 'troops.• 
2. A lengthy time frame, typically 18 months or so, 
is allotted. 
3. Consistent repetition of common themes is utilized. 
4. A variety of media are used to communicate the 
message, (p. 314) 
These researchers also describe four patterns of 
failure: 
1. Acquirers believed they had the corner on talent. 
2. Fast decisions based on shallow perception. 
3. Lack of early warning system (systematic program 
for monitoring the integration process and 
determining if it was proceeding in desired 
fashion or going off the track. Benchmarks, 
turnover rates, employee surveys, key people 
identified, employee assistance program usage, 
absentees. 
4. Unilateral imposition of policies and practices. 
Research suggests that in order for mergers and 
acquisitions to develop long term success, the process must 
be considered as a human process. Buono and Bowditch (1989) 
describe the process as more of an art than a science and 
contend that merger related prescriptions should be viewed 
as guidelines that may facilitate the integration. McCann 
and Gilkey (1988) agree encouraging a sensitivity to 
integration issues. 
Sensitivity to integration issues means pacing 
initiatives, knowing how far to go and when to stop, 
74 
establishing a limited set of themes with which to 
forge a coherent identity, prioritizing areas for 
integration, and paying sufficient attention to the 
rest of the organization to maintain performance and 





This research employed the qualitative technique of 
interpretive inquiry. Bandura (1986) states that the 
capacity to learn from other people's behavior and the 
consequences for them enables people to acquire large 
integrated patterns without having to form them by tedious 
trial and error. This study sought to identify the 
patterns of human response to the integration process of 
acquisitions and mergers through the behaviors, experiences, 
perceptions, and consequences of individuals who experienced 
the process. 
Numerous case studies of mergers are available from the 
mega mergers of R. J. Reynolds and Nabisco to small 
insurance groups and banks. These case studies describe the 
strategic planning process of the actual merger or 
acquisition, focus on the implications for the organization 
and its stakeholders, or focus on those who lead the merger. 
Although the human resource issue is cited as a crucial 
factor in the successful integration of acquisitions 
and mergers, available data is limited and is descriptive 
derived from survey data or interviews conducted secondary 
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to the "case" - the organization or the merger process 
(Marks, 1982). 
Kundera (1980) writes, 
It takes ridiculously little, an insignificant breeze 
to make what a man would have laid down his life for 
one minute, seem an absurd void the next. 
Mergers and acquisitions appear to stir such a breeze. The 
depth available through an understanding of the process can 
better equip those who must initiate, implement, or 
experience it. 
Population 
For the purpose of this study, managers of acquiring 
organizations and managers from acquired organizations were 
studied as individual cases. The primary intent was to 
sharpen insight into the human dynamics underlying the 
integration of mergers and acquisitions by identifying those 
patterns of behaviors or perceptions which appeared and 
perceived barriers and supports to the integration process. 
Further, it was intended to suggest actions to facilitate 
successful integration. 
Not less than four on-site management level 
individuals from three different textile firms which have 
made acquisitions were interviewed producing a study 
population of 13 managers and three presidents or chief 
executive officers (See Table 1). Subjects were a part of 
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the management team for a minimum period of one year prior 
to the acquisition and were employed in a management 
position at the time of the acquisition. Subjects included 
managers from both the acquiring and acquired organization. 
Participants were selected from candidates suggested by the 
organization. Selection was not random in that management 
provided the list and participants agreed to be interviewed. 
One person refused to participate and cited fear of 
repercussions from upper management as the reason. The 
management level was targeted based upon the research which 
indicated managers were most impacted by acquisitions and 
mergers (Kanter, 1989). A minimum of one year tenure with 
the organization ensured familiarity with and some grounding 
in the premerger organizational culture. Interviews were 
also conducted with three managers who were not a part of 
the three transactions, but had experience with other 
integrations. 
Subjects included a representation from the age groups 
26-35, 36-50, and 50+ to enable analysis of data related to 
normal life stage changes in addition to identification of 
cross-categorical themes. The subjects were caucasian males 
(Table 1 and Table 2). Although geographically located in 
the southeast, all subjects were not native southerners. 
The plant sites of those interviewed were located in the 
piedmont sections of North Carolina and South Carolina. 
The corporate offices were located in North Carolina, New 
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York, and Tennessee. The companies were major textile 
manufacturers. All of the merger activity represented 
horizontal integration. 
Research Design 
The researcher conducted lengthy interviews with each 
subject focused on the following areas suggested by the 
research of Buono and Bowditch (1985) . 
1. Personal descriptions of work 
2. Organizational history 
3. Types of people working at the firm 
4. What type of place the company is to work at 
5. Management style before and after the combination 
6. Policy and procedural changes 
7. The integration process itself 
8. Outcomes of the integration 
9. Individual reactions to the combinations 
10. Perceived facilitator and obstacles to the 
successful integration of the acquisition or merger. 
The purpose of the interview was to encourage the 
subject to give meaning to the process of integrating 
acquisitions or mergers. The questions using the format 
generated by Mercoby (1988) were open-ended. They were not 
intended to limit the interview but offer a framework for 
consistency and efficiency. 
Each interview was recorded and transcribed. 
79 
Subjects were given an opportunity to review the transcripts 
for accuracy and clarification if necessary. Their 
suggestions were considered by the researcher. However, the 
researcher was the final judge as to what data was included 
in the dissertation. Actual transcripts were not appended 
but were placed on file with the researcher. 
Analysis 
Each interview was analyzed separately for the depth of 
meaning it brought to understanding the human dynamics 
underlying the integration of acquisitions and mergers. The 
researcher examined the interview data to identify themes or 
patterns of behaviors which were characteristic of the 
process regardless of the setting or life stage. Finally, 
emerging themes were studied to identify barriers and 
supports to facilitating the successful integration of 
acquisitions and mergers. Strategies to prevent and resolve 
barriers were identified. 
80 
Table 1 
INTERVIEW SUBJECTS: TOTALS 
N: 16 
White Males: 16 
Position N 
Pres ident,CEO 2 
Division President 1 
Vice-President 2 
Plant Manager 1 
Human Resources 3 
Operations Manager 2 
Department Manager 3 
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Findings and Data Analysis 
This research sought to identify obstacles and supports 
encountered by managers integrating an organization 
following an acquisition or a merger. The data on which 
this research was based consisted of in-depth interviews 
with 13 middle to upper-level managers in the textile 
industry and three presidents or chief executive officers 
representing three different textile companies. A manager 
in each of the three acquiring companies was interviewed. 
The others were employed by the acquired companies. The 
chief executive officers were all a part of the acquiring 
organization. The research focused on three specific 
transactions. The experiences of those interviewed, 
however, included eight different transactions. Two upper 
level managers who had experienced an acquisition outside of 
the three identified companies were also interviewed. The 
data from these interviews was interjected as additional 
information. 
Specifically this research sought to answer five 
questions: (a) What were the identifiable patterns of 
experiences and perceptions on the integration process of 
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acquisitions and mergers among managers who were a part of 
the process? (b) What barriers and supports following an 
acquisition or merger were identified by managers? Why? 
(c) What similarities and differences in perceived barriers 
and supports were identified by managers in the acquired 
organization and mangers in the acquiring organization? 
(d) Did differences in expectations between managers of 
acquired and acquiring organizations exist? If these 
differences did exist, how was the integration process 
impacted? Why? (e) What procedures for prevention and 
resolution of the identified barriers could be identified? 
Why? 
The presentation of the data is organized according to 
six common themes identified in the interviews which were 
the perceptive lens through which the subjects described the 
integration process: personal history and work experience, 
perception of loss or gain, perception of change, 
communication, perceived value of individuals, and perceived 
opportunities for growth. The presentation of each theme 
includes the identification of obstacles and supports to the 
integration process. The themes also provided a framework 
to examine the impact of differences and similarities in 
perceptions between acquired and acquiring managers. 
Pseudonyms were used for both individuals and companies 
to provide anonymity for participants. Although the 
organizations were not the focus of this research, pertinent 
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background information is useful to establish a context for 
presenting the results. 
Context 
The textile industry emerged primarily as a highly 
developed "cottage industry" during the eighteenth century. 
The factory organization concept grew in northern England. 
The Industrial Revolution, at its peak between 1760 and 
1815, accelerated the growth of the mill system. The 
replacement of water power with steam power increased the 
speed of power-driven machinery and firmly established the 
factory system in England. Development in Europe and the 
United States followed. A succession of improvements in 
textile machinery increased the volume of production and 
lowered prices for finished cloth and garments through the 
nineteenth century. Advances in the twentieth century 
emphasized automated systems and advanced technology. 
Life in the American textile industry has changed 
dramatically from the close of the nineteenth century when 
workers left rural farms to toil in the tiny mill villages 
of the South or the industrial cities of the North. These 
textile mills spawned a new generation of companies like 
Milliken, Springs Industries, National Spinning, and Vanity 
Fair with broadened product lines responsive to changing 
technology, markets, and times. 
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Quality has become a focus demanding participative 
management, employee empowerment and committed leadership. 
As the market became crowded with products and the need to 
grow technically became crucial to maintaining a competitive 
stance, growth by acquisition became a common process. 
Horizontal integration, acquiring similar 
organizations, provided a means to expand manufacturing 
capacity and/or eliminate competitors in crowded markets. 
As technology advanced, horizontal integration also allowed 
companies to expand product lines and gain technical 
expertise. Textile companies sought to integrate vertically 
to reduce operating costs and maintain profit margins as 
labor and materials became more costly. Customers were 
purchased to control product outlets. Owning suppliers of 
raw materials and equipment or component parts decreased 
manufacturing costs. Following market trends of other 
industries, growth by acquisition gained prominence and 
spread to include acquiring unrelated industries which lead 
to conglomerates. 
The three acquiring textile companies whose management 
participated in this research followed those trends. 
Several prominent families in a small southern city 
purchased a failing textile mill. Anderson Manufacturing 
was born. The leadership and management of the company 
became successful and competitive with full ownership 
residing with one of the families. Anderson Manufacturing 
86 
began growing by acquisition in the mid 1950s by acquiring 
smaller textile operations in the same geographic region. 
According to the current president, 
in 195455,'56 the industry went on an acquisition 
binge. Business got pretty difficult for some 
companies. Lineberry over in Benson began selling off 
some holdings. They had five or six plants at the 
time. We purchased four of them. 
All of Anderson Manufacturing's acquisitions have been 
horizontal with the belief that they had a better idea of 
how to sell yarn. 
If you look at what we did I think this is what makes 
us different from companies like RJR. I do not want to 
say that ours are 'no brainers* for us but ours really 
were pretty simple. When we made these acquisitions we 
had the luxury of making them in times when we were 
over sold and we needed more capacity. One of the 
reasons we were oversold is that we were doing a good 
job with our quality. We had a great sales staff and 
we covered the market. We bought people who did not 
have those things, yet had pretty good plants. 
In June, 1989, the owners of Anderson Manufacturing and 
Benson Manufacturing shook hands on the purchase of Benson 
by Anderson. The agreement was signed in August, 1989. 
According to Larry Turner, who was brought in to head the 
operation of the three new mills, 
It was a good handshake. The company was going broke 
and the owner was real sick. His son was running the 
company... 
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Southern Textiles was formed 45 years ago and currently 
holds mills in Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, California and 
North and South Carolina. The purchase of TexSouth in 1987, 
also a horizontal acquisition, introduced new product lines 
and increased market shares in dual markets. Ned Long moved 
in as president of the knits division of the purchased 
TexSouth, two manufacturing facilities employing 
approximately 1,000. According to Long: 
Southern and TexSouth were both about the same 
size with about $300 million a year in sales. 
Southern had made some changes in strategies back 
in the early 80s. That allowed us to get into 
position to make acquisitions comfortably which is 
what we wanted to do in order to maintain control 
of the company. TexSouth really was not in that 
position. They had gone private in early '83 and 
had a big debt load. They were interested in 
finding some way to solve that problem. We were 
familiar with TexSouth. There were people working 
in Southern who had worked in TexSouth at one 
time. Common business relationships began talks 
about the possibilities of putting the businesses 
together. Over about a three or four month span 
we came up with an agreement. They signed a 
letter of intent in early March and finalized 
the deal in early April, 1987. It's a matter of 
Southern having a strategy to grow the business by 
acquisition as it made sense to us. On TexSouth's 
side, they had some problems that they were looking to 
solve. 
The third company, White Industries, is the largest 
corporation and includes operations in six states. It is 
the only one of the three listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. White Industries began in the late 1800s, 
employing local workers and building a mill town. Company 
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historical documents offered this description: 
The people shared certain characteristics. For 
one thing, the mill hands tended to be homogeneous; 
there was much 'like mindedness.' They shared 
more than poverty and insecurity; their interests 
and traditions bound them together as surely as if 
they were of the same blood. Clannishness was 
quickly evident to outsiders who went into their 
midst. 
The company grew rapidly with expanded railroad 
services constructing plant sites in neighboring 
communities. A series of successful acquisitions began in 
1900. The mills and subsidiary corporations have passed 
through five generations of Whites. White Industries 
purchased Leitner Company in 1985, another family owned 
textile operation that had grown to be listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange. According to company historical 
documents: 
It was described as the largest merger of two 
corporations in the history of United States 
Textiles. White Industries diligently searched 
for the right company to purchase in order to 
reach its long term goals for sales, earnings and 
return on equity... All parties saw the merger as 
an opportunity for both companies to become 
stronger. Both companies valued goods and both 
continually worked at upgrading plants and 
equipment. 
Leitner and Company employed approximately 9,000 and 
White Industries employed 16,000 at the time of the 
acquisition. Combined plant sites totaled more than 43 in 
the United States and overseas. 
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The integration of the three textile companies shared 
horizontal approaches. The differences in size and 
ownership offered an opportunity to explore management 
experiences in the integration process regardless of the 
variables of size and acquisition type. 
Each of the six common themes was treated separately to 
examine the human dynamics underlying the integration. 
Identification of barriers and supports to the process are 
included. Differences in perceptions and expectations 
between managers of acquired organizations and managers of 
acquiring organizations also are presented. The order in 
which the themes are presented is relative more to the 
chronology of the process than to importance. 
Personal History and Experience 
Personal history and experiences influenced the 
attitudes of those interviewed toward the integration. 
Seven of the managers who were a part of the acquired 
company, and who have successfully progressed within the new 
organization following the acquisition, described stable and 
committed family and/or personal work histories. 
One of the few acquired managers in his organization to 
be promoted to a senior management position in the parent 
organization described his background: 
I am going to be honest with you. My father does 
not have a lot of education. He is a hard worker 
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and worked for the same company for 48 years. He 
ended up as a supervisor. I guess I grew up with 
nothing handed to me. At age 11, I was cutting 
grass and buying clothes. I worked and put myself 
through school... I grew up thinking if you have a 
good job and you are committed to it, you can not 
change. You just can not take that chance. 
Another manager responded: 
Q: It seems that you believe in staying with a company. 
A: Yes, yes I do. I do not feel I can get anywhere by 
moving around. I feel that if I do a good job, I 
will be treated like I am doing a good job. That 
has worked out pretty well for me. 
Q: Did your parents have that same belief? 
A: Yes. My mother did not work outside of the home, 
but my father did. He stayed with the same 
construction company about all his life. 
A third manager, who had 21 years with the acquired 
company, stated, 
If you like your job and like what you are doing and 
you are treated fairly, which I have been everywhere I 
have worked, then why change? My parents always felt 
that way. 
Three other managers described several relocations in 
their work histories to progress either within the 
organization or with different companies histories. They 
indicated a desire not to return to that lifestyle. One 
stated, "I had two children in college and I had two more at 
home. I had a lot of self-imposed pressure to stay in this 
area." This "self-imposed pressure" appeared to be life 
stage related. However, a younger manager shared a similar 
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concern, "I had invested my entire career. I did not just 
want to walk off and leave it. My family is here." 
Five of the interviewed managers, including the three 
who were no longer with the companies, and two senior 
managers in one of the acquiring companies who had left 
other organizations following acquisitions did not perceive 
moves negatively. 
I would have gone to other parts of the country if it 
had been a move to advance my career. I was able to 
keep moving... and get a lot of experience and 
develop... 
Managers who maintained a value of commitment and 
stability based upon personal histories and external demands 
appeared to derive internal encouragement to adapt to the 
changes within the company rather than discard long term 
beliefs and personal commitments. An obstacle for those 
managers may have been that those senior executives 
interviewed who directed the integration process did not 
view moves negatively. One described exit interviews with 
displaced managers, 
I always told them, 'You will not hear me now, but you 
will hear me later. This may turn out to be the best 
thing that ever happened to you. Go on from here.' 
The ability to "go on" or remain successfully with the 
company appeared to be related to whether or not the manager 
perceived the change as a loss or a gain. 
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Loss or Gain 
The individual perceptions of the acquisitions as a 
loss or gain appeared to act as either an obstacle or a 
support to the integration. All of those interviewed who 
remained with the company following the two integrations 
described as "successful" viewed the acquisition as a gain. 
One of the managers explained, 
When I hear people talk about (the acquired company) 
days, it is mostly negative stuff. Even with the 
downsizing people see it as a positive thing to have 
happened... I think we were fortunate that a company 
like (acquiring company) wanted us. I think we had a 
better opportunity because it was locally owned. 
A manager in the same organization agreed, 
If it had not been for (acquiring company) those mills 
would have been stopped... I think that had it been 
bought by one of these other companies the improvements 
would not have been made. 
A manager in the second company described having 
access to the information that the acquired company had 
financial difficulties. 
I was in a position where I saw a lot of the 
financial information. We had gone through a 
leveraged buy out and we had no money. We were 
successful, but we had no money. The bank owned 
everything. The cash came in for receivables and went 
to the bank. We always had a revolving line of 
credit. It was going down, but all the profits went 
to paying off the debt which left no money. I knew 
that if we really hit a bad time in business that the 
bank could take us over... a lot of people did not know 
what kind of shape the company was in... They did not 
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understand that they had a job today because (the 
acquiring company) bought the company. 
A colleague agreed, 
In my estimation, (the acquired company) was not the 
most progressive textile company in several areas-
pay, the way people were treated, advancement 
opportunities, just a number of things that after a 
span of time had begun to surface that did not appeal 
to me... It was an opportunistic thing for me that 
we were acquired. 
Both of these managers were exploring other job options at 
the time of the acquisition and described the acquisition as 
"the best thing that ever happened for the company." 
These managers continued to describe fellow managers 
who were no longer with the company. 
He has been forced to be accountable and it has been 
difficult for him to adjust to it. We have a 
corporation now that owns us and expects some 
accountability which is the way you should run a 
business. It is contrary to the way those folks have 
operated- some of them, for years. We still have some 
people, not just management, but also in production and 
some auxiliary areas who see what (the acquiring 
company) is having to do to put it on track. They are 
faulting (the new company) for the things they are 
being forced to do because (the old company) never did 
any of these difficult things. 
Managers in the third acquisition did not perceive the 
acquisition as a personal gain. "We had a lot of things 
going on. They wanted to tap that resource." In describing 
systems another manager stated, 
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When we were with (the old company) and it has been 
proven to be so now, we had some systems that were 
more sophisticated and more updated. Yet, we still did 
away with the more updated systems and went back to an 
old antiquated system because that is the way they did 
things. That was frustrating. 
These same managers were aware that the company would 
be sold because the incumbent owners wanted to retire. One 
described the initial optimism they felt, 
All of the people were very, very happy because they 
knew we would continue to exist, maybe not as an 
individual plant but as a group...We had an excellent 
reputation when (the company) took us over. 
Reality was disappointing. 
What disappointed me was that I had always heard that 
(the acquiring company) was such a people oriented 
company. Everyone said, 'Boy you are going to love 
(the acquiring company) 1.. .We did not have the same 
privileges we perceived were available. 
Another stated, 
The hourly people saw the benefits as being less than 
they had before. The salaried associates perceived 
it the same way with the exception of retirement and 
profit sharing which was much better than we had 
before. They perceived it as less even though it 
probably coincided with the rise in medical costs. As 
far as dealing from a managerial level, we felt like 
the redhaired stepchildren. That was not just here, 
but at all the (old company) locations. 
These managers questioned the objectivity of the acquiring 
company's decisions to rationalize operations. 
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Things were done to protect the (acquiring company's) 
plants in a particular area when we were more 
profitable at another location running the same thing. 
We closed the plants and moved them to another 
site... There were less feelings for where the 
(acquired company's) plants were. I think possibly 
some of those things could have been done differently. 
According to another manager, 
They really feel that that plant was sacrificed to 
protect the old (acquiring company) people. We have 
closed six old (acquired company) locations recently. 
We have not closed any old (acquiring company) 
locations. 
According to a manager who left the company, the 
acquisition was viewed as a loss. 
Speaking personally, no, and it continues to be that 
way. Now, years after the acquisition, they have cut 
out 1200 jobs. When you cut out 1200 hourly jobs you 
lose 30-40 salaried managers. It is a tough time for 
people like myself who are highly motivated and want to 
grow. 
The owners and top executives who initiated 
acquisitions viewed the acquisitions as gains. The 
transactions were not consummated if they did not. The 
managers, however, did not pursue the acquisition nor could 
they prevent it from occurring. They had three choices: (1) 
support the integration, (2) resist the integration, or (3) 
leave the company. 
Closely connected to whether a manager perceived the 
integration as a loss or gain was the attitude toward 
change. Personal resistance to or acceptance of change 
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appeared as a common element in examining obstacles and 
supports to successful integration. 
Attitude Toward Change 
Each manager interviewed described the need to change 
as a necessity. 
Their methods of doing things. Well, if you are not 
willing to change them, you might as well leave because 
you are not going to get along with the company. 
A manager described a fellow manager who did not survive the 
integration. 
He just absolutely refused to get along with anybody. 
He wanted it to be his way, he did not care if (the 
acquiring company) owned it or if the President owned 
it. That does not work, you have to be flexible. 
A manager employed by an acquiring company who was 
responsible for integrating one of the acquisitions 
explained that change was too difficult for some of the 
acquired managers. 
They had been operating like that for so long that they 
were not going to change. Most of them just finally 
quit. We did not have to fire many of them at all. 
They just said, 'Look, this is not for me.• 
A manager with another acquired company described 
resistance to change as the quickest way out. 
Q: What would you recommend to a friend who worked 
for a company that had just been acquired? 
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A: If they were corporate staff, the first thing I 
would recommend to them is to find out what 
they do in their particular area. If they do it 
differently, be ready to make the transition. 
A performer has a lot less to worry about than 
someone who does not perform. I would tell 
them not to resist change because resistance is 
the quickest way out. If you talk to the old 
(acquired company) people who are no longer 
here, the vast majority of them are not because 
they resisted. That is the quickest way out. 
Those interviewed recognized that the pervasiveness of 
change was difficult. 
When you take a company that operated a certain way, 
then you change that, you are changing not only the 
physical facilities but the mindset, the procedures, 
every phase from stem to stern. It is almost like 
being in intensive care. 
Experience led one manager to believe that there 
existed a point at which changes were impossible. 
I am not sure where the line is. Involved is the 
dynamics of the person. Some people are just more 
flexible than others. After a point I think it is 
probably impossible for anyone to make that transition. 
They have become acclimated to a life style, a routine. 
I do not think you can relate it to age. I think it is 
a mindset. Some of our folks have been in the 
trenches for too long to have that resiliency. 
An important distinction was made concerning changes. 
One of the acquired managers explained that he had changed 
processes and procedures, but not his basic commitments to 
himself. 
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I made that decision early on. That I am me. I 
operate one way. I take a stand. I am honest. I 
stand up for my people and I have not changed that. 
Paralleling the importance of the attitude of acquired 
management toward change was the integration of processes by 
the acquiring management. One of the division presidents 
interviewed explained that the companies may have found it 
difficult to change. "I think you get into a mindset that 
if you have been successful doing something, it is hard to 
accept the fact that you have to do things differently.11 
A manager with an acquired company suggested that 
acquiring management be open to adopting methods from the 
acquired company. 
I would recommend that (the acquiring management) be 
open minded enough to look at the systems not only from 
what they are familiar with. Keep the best, most 
modern system. Really we are going back now after 
we went to their old system and lost our more modern 
system. Five years later they are going back to what 
we had initially. I think there is a lesson to be 
learned. I think there was just a personal prejudice 
toward what they had. I am sure we were 'they' to them 
too. 
Another manager warned, 
If the acquisition company is not willing to learn from 
who they buy, then they are going to be in serious 
trouble before too long. Their way is not necessarily 
the best way. It may be right, but it is not 
necessarily the best. You can not have duplications, 
but you can not automatically assume that all of the 
management of the company you are buying is all worse. 
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Even those managers who were flexible and viewed the 
acquisition as a positive change found constant instability 
difficult. One manager referred to it as the state of "ever 
change." 
There is a saying around here that if you do not like 
the way things are just wait. They will change it 
someway. N was tremendous for this group. Now, he is 
gone and J is here. I am not saying J is not good, but 
all of a sudden there is a new set of standards. You 
are just getting comfortable with one and now it is 
changed. JL was in charge of sales. I was very 
comfortable working with him. I knew what he expected. 
Boom, now they have moved him out. There is a new 
set of expectations. It seems that it is always 
changing. It seems right when you are getting 
comfortable to a point, it changes. Then you are 
uncomfortable, somewhat insecure. That has been tough. 
The organization had experienced these constant changes for 
a three year period at the time of this interview. 
The length of the change process created obstacles in a 
second company as well. The only noticeable change during 
the first two years of the integration was that division 
staff began attending meetings. "Until something started 
happening we thought we would stay like we were," related 
one manager. 
Another manager described the process, 
It was almost like we have three years to do something. 
We do not do anything for the first two and one half 
years. What are you going to remember? The last six 
months where everything changed so rapidly. 
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Each of the managers involved recommended that a 
company be more expedient in the process. 
At staff level it affected them tremendously- the 
not knowing. They lost a few key people during that 
time but not many... I would tell them to move a lot 
quicker, especially in areas where people were going to 
lose their jobs because the people who were left would 
be a lot more productive. We had a lot of reduction in 
output because of these people who did not know if they 
were going to have a job. I would tell them to move a 
lot quicker. 
The ability and willingness of management, both in the 
acquired company and the acquiring company, to adapt and 
initiate change was identified as a support to the 
integration process. Constant, long-term change, even for 
those who were flexible, tested individual limits and became 
an obstacle. Resistance to change by both individuals and 
system were obstacles to integration. 
Frequent and immediate communication was cited by all 
of the managers as necessary to facilitate the integration. 
Clarifying expectations reduced anxieties and insecurities 
surrounding the changes. 
Communication Issues 
Acquiring management in two of the three transactions 
immediately began to communicate expectations to the 
acquired staff. 
They came in and had big meetings with everybody... They 
assured all of the people that they were going to be 
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treated fairly, they were going to be paid equally, and 
that as long as they ran their jobs properly they were 
going to have a job. 
This was viewed as an important initial step. 
It is important to know what is going to happen 
including benefits and whatever. That is not as 
important as knowing that you are going to have a job. 
Both companies organized employee meetings to introduce 
the new company immediately following the acquisition. One 
company president described the process: 
Once we ink the deal, starting with day two, we meet 
with every single employee in the organization in 
groups of 10 to 12, some 24-30. We go in, the CEO, 
myself, vice-president of management, head of sales, 
vice-president of finance, the plant manager, and 
personnel manager. We each have something to say. At 
that point in time, we outline everything. We outline 
why we bought them, what we hope to do with the 
business, what our objectives are, what we're going to 
do and what they can look forward to seeing us do and 
what the history has been in our organization. We also 
tell them a little bit about us and where else we 
operate plants, what our market share is, what our 
philosophy is. We introduce ourselves to them. We 
tell them what their benefits are going to be- the 
changes, if any, in hospitalization; if any in pension; 
if any in our schedules; if any in seniority, in 
housing, or in any other conditions that might happen. 
We explain all that to them right up front. Then we 
ask if they have any questions. You get a lot of 
questions like, 'Are we going to get a raise?' We 
answer that head on, 'Not until we get profitable.' It 
has been a great process for us. Frankly, I do not 
know how you can do it any other way and expect to be 
successful. The people have questions. In a 
manufacturing operation, I do not care what it is, you 
have some know-it-alls out there. If you allow them to 
tell what you are going to do, you are asking for 
morale problems. That's why it is best to hear it from 
the horse's mouth. 
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The managers of the textile company acquired by this 
president's company also believed that communication was a 
key to the success of the integration. They described it as 
"excellent." The interaction with the chief executive was 
cited as important in both companies for credibility, 
...they would have believed them (middle managers) but 
it would not have been to the high degree as coming 
from (the CEO). I think that was like icing on the 
cake. 
The key difference appeared to be that one of these 
acquiring companies fulfilled commitments made in these 
early meetings. 
They have held up to their end of the bargain. They 
have done everything that they said they would. I 
think that is one way that they go off on the right 
foot with the people. In return they got a whole lot 
of good employees. 
The second company moved more slowly following the 
initial meetings. According to the manager who was 
terminated, 
The getting answers went too long. We just kept doing 
the same things. Just the fact that it was going on 
the same did not solve the problem. As a result we 
lost that credibility... We had to delay it again and 
again. Finally it just got to be kind of a joke. 
The division president explained that these barriers to 
communication were created by inadequate planning of 
management resources. 
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When we expanded and bought (the acquired company) and 
got more complex, complicated businesses with much 
bigger product lines, we found out quickly that we did 
not have the quality people running our MIS group or 
the systems to run those businesses. Another problem 
we found is that we had a sound business strategy to 
grow the business and we had a good financial strategy 
and position to grow the business but we did not have 
the depth of management to acquire a business that we 
needed to be able to go into and have an impact. 
As a result managers did not feel secure. The initial 
fifteen minute meetings "did a lot" for the managers but it 
was not enough to assure them of a future with the company. 
One manager suggested, 
The whole idea would be to tell them how important they 
would be to success of the merger. This importance, 
not just at the time of the merger, but long term. Get 
them comfortable early. 
In the third integration, where few changes were made 
until the last six months of the third year, communication 
was described as a problem, possibly attributable to the 
magnitude of the merger. "We were pretty big then. I think 
it was as big a shock to them as it was to us." 
A manager with this acquiring company who resigned 
after the merger to work for the company whose communication 
was described first in this section, compared the two. "A 
company does not have to be faceless, like a big public 
company." 
He attributed the lack of communication as lack of 
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understanding of the operation, despite the fact that both 
were textile companies. 
I really do not think they understood what it took to 
run a plant, to run a textile manufacturing company... 
They just tried to run it without being involved. 
Communication within the first company was described as 
excellent by another manager from the acquired company. 
I get lots of information. If they were coming out 
here to terminate me, I would know it before they got 
here because I already have the information. I know 
what is expected up front. I know who is making 
what. I am allowed to go in other plants anytime I 
want to tour. 
When the company implemented changes, notices were 
posted on bulletin boards describing exactly what would 
happen. According to one of the mangers, "You know exactly 
what is going on. They keep people informed." 
This open communication was a change for these 
acquired managers. 
It was very poor with (the acquired company). We 
even had some of the other plant managers who would 
make snide remarks... I feel like we are more in 
harmony than we were in (the acquired company). I feel 
like I can go over and talk to JM anytime I want to 
about anything. 
The president described "an open door policy" which 
encouraged two way communication. 
We do not ever leave a meeting with one of our 
associates that we do not tell them that we have an 
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open door policy. If they do not get satisfaction, we 
want them to follow the chain of command, but they can 
come to us. 
The owner and chief executive officer communicated the 
policy both verbally and nonverbally. 
The (CEO) likes to come through here on Saturdays. He 
comes in casual clothes. He just likes to mingle with 
everybody- shaking hands and speaking to them. 
Each manager interviewed with this company appeared to 
have adopted the same policy. 
I make it a point to be at work every morning before 
shift changes so if the people need to talk to me or I 
need to talk to them, I will be available six days a 
week. I get dedicated employees that way. I feel we 
have a pretty tight knit group. Everybody knows if 
they need to talk, they can talk to their supervisor, 
to me, or right up the line- somebody is going to 
listen. 
The president explained that close constant physical 
contact could not be maintained with those plants that were 
geographically distant but "we are still active managers. I 
am in those plants. We all are. There is no mysterious 
(corporate office) out there." A company newspaper produced 
by the employees was also used to promote "that sense of 
community in that people know what is happening in other 
plants." 
The communication also was viewed as an improvement in 
the second company, 
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We know more about where we stand than we ever did 
before in terms of making a profit or problems, or how 
we stand on working on those things. There is more 
sharing of information. 
However, one of these managers described the 
communication more as monitoring than as inclusion. 
There are a few more layers of management or 
communication that has a built in 'got to have 
approval' type of thing... It is a very elaborate and 
expensive record keeping. You are looking at bottom 
lines everyday as opposed to the way it was before. It 
just takes so much more in the number of phone calls 
and the pounds of paper for reports and presentations. 
Getting all these things ready as to how we did this 
week and the week before and quarterly meetings and 
quarterly reviews. Then you have rehearsals for the 
quarterly meetings. You script it and you orchestrate 
and you prepare and you run people through here to get 
ready. 
Another manager in the same company agreed with the 
description of communication as monitoring. "It is like they 
are going to prove that that is the way you do things." 
Two way communication appeared to have been blocked by 
key individuals. 
He neither solicited nor accepted opinions from anyone 
here. When they were offered, he immediately dismissed 
them. The people left that area. 
Some of the existing key managers were described as 
blocks to communication. A manager described one of the 
vice presidents in the acquiring organization. 
We would say we need to do this. It would be totally 
dismissed if it was something he did not understand how 
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to do or if it was something he disagreed with. Most 
of the time he did not understand it... That in itself 
caused a lot of problems. 
Both of these senior managers in the acquiring company 
were no longer with the company. The new leadership was 
reported to 
encourage participating, putting decision making down, 
sharing information and breaking down the walls between 
the different functions... We put everybody on a level 
playing field from an information standpoint. Instead 
of telling everybody what to do, we started asking what 
we ought to do. 
Managers in the third company recognized that "keeping 
the communication lines open up and down was definitely a 
key through the whole process." Lack of communication was 
reported as a continuing problem. 
Even to this day we still do not communicate the way we 
should be able to communicate. We continue to try, but 
it is not something that you have overnight. 
The fact that the acquisition occurred six years earlier is 
paradoxical. 
A second manager, describing "poor communication," 
stated, 
We find out more in the newspaper than we find out from 
our own company. We could make an announcement to shut 
down a plant and we would read it in the newspaper 
before we knew it here. You know it in the plant the 
same day you read it in the paper. 
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To facilitate integration he recommended being "open in 
their communications and quicker so that it eliminates a lot 
of the worry and a lot of the concerns." 
These managers recalled the interaction prior to the 
acquisition: 
(the acquired company) was very close knit... You 
could pick up the phone and call for advice or just to 
talk. We can not do that with (the acquired company). 
Since 1985 I have visited one location in depth and 
parts of two other plants. When I had been with (the 
acquired company) for that period of time, I had been 
at all the plants and the managers had been in mine. 
He described communication in the acquired company as a free 
flow of information. 
Communication was cited by all the managers as a key 
support to successful integration of acquisitions and 
mergers. Those managers who described an open, free flow of 
information from upper levels to frontline employees, and 
laterally to fellow managers, also described a higher degree 
of satisfaction with the integration, a feeling of being a 
part of the team, and less personal anxiety concerning the 
change. Conversely, those managers who described poor 
communication, expressed less satisfaction with the merger, 
more personal anxiety, and feelings of disenfranchisement. 
Knowledge, depth of management, and pre-planning on 
the part of the acquiring company were perceived to 
facilitate communication networks during the integration. 
Closed, communication that was directed only from upper 
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management and discouraged participation was an obstacle to 
successful integration. The responses were similar to those 
created by the absence of communication. 
Communication was identified as a key because these 
acquisitions began with financial statements, contracts, 
buildings, and machinery. However, in the final analysis 
these acquisitions were about people. One company president 
stated, "You have to do a good job of informing the people 
because you are acquiring some good people." 
A manager agreed, "that is all this is, is a people 
business- trying to get the most out of people, motivating 
them instead of brow beating them." Open communication and 
inviting participation in decision making were described as 
important steps toward demonstrating a value for the 
acquired managers. 
Valuing Individuals 
The president of one of the acquiring companies was 
critical of financiers who sit on Wall Street buying 
companies, 
because he does not care one thing about these 
people. So, why should they care about him. Look at 
Cannon and what has happened to them. For them to say 
management does not care about me, they are right, 
they do not. RJR- do you think for one minute that 
Ross Johnson cared about those employees? They could 
have cared less. 
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The managers interviewed agreed that employees look for 
indicators that a company values the employees as a support 
to the integration process. The obstacles created by the 
insecurities following the acquisition focused the need for 
reassurance. According to one manager, 
The first thing is a feeling of what is going to 
happen. Are they buying us just for the (product) 
name? Those sort of things go through your mind. 
Insecurity is bred whether you mean for it to or not. 
Verbal communication was insufficient at this point. 
You can say anything you want to, but if you have it 
going over in your mind, what you hear is not going 
to do any good. You have to show them. You are going 
to have to show me. 
Actions which fostered a sense of team and belonging 
for the acquired managers appeared to support integration. 
Acquired managers in one of the integrations described 
feeling a part of the team prior to the acquisition. 
We had the feeling that we cared about one another. We 
would stick up for each other. We did a lot of 
fellowshipping. We went on outings... there was a 
fraternalistic feeling that I think was genuine caring 
about people. 
Another of these managers responded, 
I do miss feeling a part of the corporation instead of 
just feeling part of this plant. The plant managers 
are starting to build teams among themselves now (six 
years later). I think the real benefit will be when it 
filters down. 
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The management group interviewed who perceived an 
increase in team support were acquired by an organization 
that named plants by the corporate name and a number, Plant 
17, for example. Employees worked for the company, not a 
specific plant. 
The other managers were "looking for someone to show us 
something and that did not happen." What they perceived 
happening was a "clash of philosophies." 
At (the acquired company) we hired and developed 
supervisors, department managers, and staff people 
that were technically oriented. People who could run 
their job technically. (The acquiring company) 
brought people along much faster. A lot of people 
they brought along did not have the technical skills 
to run the same job in the same way that the 
(acquiring company's) managers would. So (the 
acquiring company) developed a technical department... 
The first real anxiety type problems we had in the 
conversion was this technical department coming in and 
telling you everything you were doing wrong. You may 
be sitting there making plenty of money for them and 
so forth and then they would come in and tell you what 
you were doing wrong. They would really try to get 
you to do it (the acquiring company's) way, not the 
best way, but their way or the technical services 
department's way. That created a lot of animosity. 
The managers reported an "us and them" feeling created 
when key promotions continued to go only to the acquiring 
company's original employees. 
If there was a consolidation, it appeared that the 
(acquired company) person was the one who was 
discontinued. The (acquiring company) person was put 
over the whole thing. I did not see a lot of 
promotions from (the acquired company). 
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These observations created anxiety for the managers. 
One explained, 
I never felt like they were out to get me, 
but I felt like I would be gotten. It was not a 
personal thing. It was just that they know these guys 
and they do not know me. 
The managers attributed increased feelings of job 
security to the fact that they had been given the time to 
"prove that they can produce." The manager who chose to 
resign, "got tired of it." He explained, "I needed another 
challenge. I just needed more responsibility. I just did 
not see that coming." He described his new employer, 
I happen to like the way he thinks. It is a great 
company. He loves people, he believes in the plants 
and re-investing in the company. That was it for me. 
When asked what he believed an acquiring company needed to 
do to support managers in the integration of the 
acquisition, he answered, 
I would want their confidence and I guess I would want 
to be given the opportunity to show them we could be 
profitable... whatever it would be, I would be looking 
to them for help. 
Managers interviewed from a second integration 
described receiving this type support. 
I think if you interviewed the workforce here now they 
would tell you that things are 100% better now than 
they were two years ago. They are getting more hours, 
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they are making more money, they have more job 
security. They did not feel that way at first. 
The employee meetings with high profile involvement of 
the senior management, including the CEO and president, 
mitigated the initial anxieties by explaining the company 
philosophy of employee involvement and empowerment. The 
president of the company conveyed a belief that you have to 
let the people know what is important to you and give them 
the confidence to help accomplish it. 
I think it makes a statement when you go out there and 
say, *1 believe in quality. From this day forward if 
you have to shut the machine down, you do it. That 
tell them something... Here I like to say there is no 
difference between me and the guy sweeping the floor. 
We just have different responsibilities. We are both 
essential. 
A manager of the acquired company agreed that the 
company is "high quality oriented and high people oriented" 
stating, 
They showed me that when they gave everybody who worked 
for (the acquired company) a job. Even the managers 
who lost their jobs were given jobs in the beginning. 
They were not able to hang on to them because they did 
not perform their duties. 
One of the other managers described his initial fear 
of being perceived as a failure because of the performance 
of the acquired company. 
I thought to myself whether or not I have to go hunt 
for a job, I would give anything to have six months 
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with this company to prove that I had sense enough to 
do the job. 
What his manager found was a company that allowed 
mistakes and encouraged him to take responsibility. 
There is too great a need for team work and sharing of 
ideas and things... When I first came down here they 
said 'you run that place like you own it'... You are 
told here are your objectives. You just do it. When 
you do it and feel good about it then that is 
security. Running your job is the best security in 
the world. 
A second manager related a similar experience. 
I think that the thing that helped me switch over was 
when the plant manager told me to take these 
certain people. He gave me assignments of what he 
wanted them to do and he went on about his business. 
I did a good job on what he asked me to do. He told 
me how much he appreciated what I was doing... I just 
feel like I got off on the right foot with the 
managers... They valued my opinion about what to do 
on certain things. 
The president and division manager, ironically, 
questioned giving everyone an opportunity. 
We gave everybody a chance but I will tell you what. 
We would have been better off if we had just cut our 
losses from day one and told them 'sorry we have not 
got anything for you!1 Then we could have put some of 
our own guys in there for the transition. The 
acquisition would have been a lot quicker. I can tell 
you that is a lesson that we have learned. We will 
not make that mistake again. 
The acquired managers believed that a policy of 
immediately terminating managers following an acquisition 
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would have had serious repercussions. "It would be too big 
a shock just to come in and wipe out everything at one 
time." 
Another believed: 
that might have put a bad taste in 
some people's mouths. I believe they would have lost a 
lot of good employees... It would have really shaken 
everybody up. It would have made people feel 
insecure. 
Objectively applied rationale for terminating and 
promoting employees appeared to support the integration 
process. Subjective criteria created obstacles. One 
manager described the impact that seeing decisions based on 
politics had on him. 
I have seen instances where performance is not enough. 
In a company like (the acquiring company) I have seen 
it a lot. Politics mean a lot. Playing politics will 
get you a long way, it did in that company... All 
those positions were just politically grabbed up. One 
friend of mine was the quality director for the 
company. He ended up getting knocked out of the job by 
some guy who never worked in quality. He was named 
quality director of the team because he was real tight 
with the vice president. When I saw that, it just 
enraged me and it did not even happen to me. How can 
you do those kinds of things? Those kinds of things 
made it easy for me to leave the company. 
Each of these acquired managers also cited recognition 
as important. One described "atta boys", memos sent to 
commend good performance from senior management. 
You know when you do something wrong but this is the 
first job I have ever had where somebody has told me 
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that I have done a good job. To me these thank yous 
are worth a thousand dollars. I had just as soon have 
this as a thousand dollar bonus. Of course I would 
like to have the bonus but the bonus you just go out 
and that $500-1000 is gone in an hour and you forget 
about it. But something like this you hang on to it 
and it goes a long way. And that is why I am here and 
that is why I plan on staying here. 
The second demonstration of a sense of value noted by 
these managers was the immediate material investment the 
acquiring company made. 
I saw a company willing to invest money in the 
company. The last few years with (the acquired 
company) we could not get the money to buy parts we 
needed... they were just running everything they had, 
never making any changes. You could tell that they 
did not care. (The acquiring company) has completely 
modernized two of the plants. They put a ton of 
money in each of them. It is unbelievable. 
Investment was a part of the strategic plan for this 
company. The president warned, 
Overpaying and over leveraging is the wrong way to make 
an acquisition... There is no money to put back into 
the operation, the operations are not efficient. They 
are outdated, quality levels suffer. 
The division president of the third acquiring company 
also described investing in the acquired company directly to 
convey a sense of value and team. 
One example of what I am talking about is that we had 
a hot food cafeteria downstairs, cooked by employees 
that all the people who worked in the offices ate in. 
It was prepared daily and cooked on site in a very 
nice facility. Out in the plant we had a hot food 
cafeteria, but it was all brought in by a vending 
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company. The quality of the food was different and 
the plant cafeteria was a pig pen. What we did was 
eliminate hot food and put vending in both areas. We 
spent $60,000 out in the plant upgrading the facility. 
We got rid of designated parking. We started having 
weekly staff meetings. 
The acquisition was a "God send" for one of the 
managers because he 
got opportunities. Now I am running a $38,000,000 
division... They organized quality teams. They 
solicited participative management. They solicited 
view points from subordinates. It is a team concept. 
It is a lock arms, not horns concept. 
He described the new senior manager, 
He is the kind of guy who delegates. He has let me run 
this place from day one... It has been a partnership. 
If I needed help I went to him. I like it that way. I 
do not like anyone peering over my shoulder. 
The manager who was terminated by the acquiring company 
did not share these sentiments. 
I would say (the acquiring company) is a little more 
uptight. Am I doing the right thing? Am I doing it 
the right way? Am I dressed the right way?... (The 
acquired company) was a little more rigid or exact and 
demanding... I always had the feeling that what I did 
or how I did it was not a concern to my boss as long as 
I got it done. I kept him informed when they needed to 
be informed. After (we were acquired) it was tough to 
even feel like you had communicated enough and on time 
to please... even though I knew what I wanted to 
accomplish was for the good of the organization. 
He continued to relate that this led him to "analysis to 
paralysis." 
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It almost got to the point of what the heck as long as 
I keep my nose clean and everyone knows what is going 
on. I got hit with a couple of things where I got, 
•What do you mean you have already done it? Well, who 
decided that?* Well, I did... You just worry about 
it, you really do. 
This situation was particularly irksome for this manager who 
viewed himself as a "key player." He was accustomed to a 
much more "laid back" approach where the attitude was "we 
will talk about it before suppertime and we will settle it 
before we go to bed." 
Another manager presented a similar scenario with a 
manager who he was promoted to replace. 
D was an asset... I think if he had been allowed to 
run his division and then been held accountable for it 
he would have felt more comfortable. He would have had 
more of the decision making process. 
The replacing manager discussed the senior management style 
prior to accepting the position. 
If I have to go in there, I have to be able to make the 
decisions without having to get his clearance on every 
little thing. I have to have the authority to make 
decisions, but he has to hold me accountable. 
Valuing the individual was conveyed through inclusion, 
investment and affirmation. These appeared to support the 
integration process by encouraging commitment and 
facilitating growth. 
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Opportunities For Growth 
A recurring theme among the managers was the creation 
of, or the elimination of, opportunity. These "windows of 
opportunity" were created by the acquiring management and by 
the acquired managers. The exodus of some managers who 
could not or would not change to meet the style of the new 
management created opportunities for promotions for others. 
As one manager explained, "You have to hang on long enough 
until you are considered a part of the company." This 
manager believed the acquired manager must assume 
responsibility for creating some of those opportunities. 
I tried to create as many opportunities as I could to 
go to (the corporate offices) to spend a week... I 
spent a lot of time with a lot of different people. I 
asked a million questions. I asked about (the CEO)... 
One day I was going out the door. This big tall guy 
came up to me, looked down and said, 'Larry, I have not 
had an opportunity to meet you yet. I am (the CEO)!' 
I almost passed out. He knew my name and who I was. I 
guess from that day on I was his biggest fan... You 
have to be willing to wait until you have made the 
transformation into becoming a part of the company, 
then you can make a contribution. 
The managers had to be prepared to take advantage of 
the opportunities when management presented them. One of 
the terminated managers was offered a transfer early in the 
acquisition process as an assistant to a vice president. 
I would aspire to that job because he was close to 
retirement. I think that probably did not set too well 
although they did accept my selling them that I needed 
to be here... I did not go and they hired a person 
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close to what is happening. He has been named the vice 
president and my old boss is retiring. 
Another manager believed that one had to take advantage 
of the opportunities when they were presented because the 
luck could change. 
...I took the company jet back to H. It was just me 
and the two pilots. I looked out at the mountains and 
thought about the days when I was just a little 
mountain kid who did not have anything. Now I was 
riding in a corporate jet. It could crash down, but 
the key to that thing is that life is fortuitous. You 
never know. The wave came on board and I swam. I was 
lucky. Someone saved me. Just as easily as it came it 
can go. 
A manager in another company also affirmed luck as 
important. 
I think one thing is that you have to be a little 
lucky. I really do. If I had been with a plant that 
was closed down then I probably would have been looking 
for a job. So far we were just lucky enough that we 
were remodeling these plants back at the time (the 
acquired company) bought us. 
Luck would not keep one on the job. Good performance 
was necessary. 
I do not think they are going to keep someone around 
just because he happens to be at a plant they plan to 
keep open, because there are too many people out there 
available for them easily to make a change. Even 
though I was lucky enough to be here, I think I have 
done a good job. 
The advice offered by another manager for someone who 
was a part of an integration summarized most of the views of 
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those interviewed. 
The other advice I would give someone is listen, stay 
alert, do not get in to conversations of we and they. 
Be yourself, run your job. If you are running your job 
and you are successful at it, nine out ten times it is 
going to be recognized. But if you appear to be afraid 
and you start, in layman's language, 'sucking up' and 
trying to butter up and do things differently, then I 
think you are going to be recognized as a weak person. 
Acquiring companies were commended to "be fair in 
decisions" and to "evaluate people" to assure everyone an 
opportunity. Closed doors led managers to seek 
opportunities outside the company or become discontent and 
frustrated with the organization. 
Both the company and the individual became a barrier 
through closed career opportunities and poor performance. 
Supports were created when both the managers and the 
companies were open to the possibilities. 
Data Analysis 
The perceptions of the managers interviewed offered 
valuable insights into the interpretive "Why?" of this 
research. The specific research questions are addressed. 
Question a: What were the identifiable patterns of 
experiences and perceptions on the integration process among 
managers who have been a part of the process? 
Six common themes were identified in the research 
relevant to how integration was perceived by the managers 
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interviewed: personal history and work experience, 
perception of loss or gain, attitude toward change, 
communication, valuing of individuals, and perceived 
opportunities for growth. 
Question b: What barriers and supports following an 
acquisition or merger were identified by managers in the 
acquired organization and managers in the acquiring 
organization? 
Personal histories and experiences which valued 
commitment and stability appeared to encourage managers to . 
move forward with the new company. Deeply forged management 
styles from years of application that had grown resistant to 
modification were significant barriers to the process. 
Acquired and acquiring managers perceived resistance to 
change as an obstacle to integration. Individuals who 
appeared to be successful at some level within the new 
organization described adapting to the changing environment 
rather than clinging to the policies, procedures, and 
expectations of the past. Acquiring managers who were 
described as supportive of the integration process also 
demonstrated a willingness to adapt to the new organization. 
Individuals who perceived the change as an improvement 
or a gain offered less resistance, even to the point of 
welcoming the integration. Those who viewed the integration 
as a loss expressed more difficulty supporting the 
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integration and found it more acceptable to leave the 
organization. 
Immediate, clearly stated, constant, and consistent 
communication supported the integration of the acquisitions. 
Direct communication and interaction with managers at the 
highest levels of the organizations, including chief 
executive officers, presidents, and owners, generated the 
greatest support for the process. Withholding information, 
blocking communication channels, and refusal to listen were 
obstacles to the process. Companies can support the process 
of integration by expeditiously detailing benefits, goals, 
expectations, and objectively evaluating significant aspects 
of the acquired company for value and retention. 
Question c: What similarities and differences in perceived 
barriers and supports were identified by managers in the 
acquired organization and managers in the acquiring 
organization? 
Both differences and similarities existed between 
managers in the acquired companies and managers in the 
acquiring companies in the perceived barriers and supports. 
There was no disagreement in the need for communication to 
support the integration. All managers interviewed perceived 
communication as a key to successful integration. However, 
managers in two of the acquired organizations perceived the 
communication to be "one way." They viewed the 
communication as coming down to them as the transmission of 
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information and instructions with limited opportunity for 
input. 
The perception of the acquisition as a loss or as a 
gain was a source of differing perspectives. Acquiring 
managers in each of the integrations perceived the 
acquisition as a gain for the acquired company. The 
perceptions of managers in the acquired companies 
varied in relation to perceived personal losses in 
opportunities for growth and to the amount of anxiety 
experienced in the process related to job security and 
performance. 
The managers in the acquired firms reported 
experiencing more anxiety than those in the acquiring firms. 
This anxiety appeared to be related to the perceived loss of 
control over the situation. Acquiring managers appeared to 
be aware that the ultimate decisions rested with the 
acquiring company, but believed that the primary control for 
job retention, which was performance, rested with the 
individuals. 
Both acquired and acquiring managers perceived 
resistance to change as an obstacle to integration. The 
perceived resistance to change from the acquiring company 
was described as more related to systems and in the acquired 
companies the resistance was perceived as more related to 
individuals. 
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Question d: Were there differences in expectations between 
managers of acquired and acquiring organization? If 
differences did exist, how was the integration process 
impacted? 
Both acquired and acquiring managers expected the 
integrations to be successful. A major difference in 
expectations was related to the change process itself. The 
managers of the acquiring firms were expecting to initiate 
change while the managers of the acquired firms expressed an 
expectation that they would be changed. 
Another differing expectation was that the majority of 
the acquired managers expressed a desire to be given the 
opportunity to prove themselves to the acquiring company, 
but appeared to expect their jobs to be terminated 
regardless of the level of performance. Acquiring managers 
appeared to expect failure by the majority of the acquired 
managers. 
Question e: What procedures for prevention and resolution 
of the identified barriers could be identified from the 
data? 
Preacquisition planning to include the human resource 
component appeared to facilitate the integration process. 
The following procedures for the prevention and resolution 
of barriers were suggested by this research. 
1. Develop a clear vision of the organizational 
integration with clearly defined roles for key players. 
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Involve acquired managers as soon as possible. 
2. Prepare a written strategy outlining goals to 
provide consistent direction. 
3. Conduct an objective evaluation of systems and plans 
for system consolidation. 
4. Conduct an objective appraisal of financial, 
managerial and production capabilities of both 
organizations. 
5. Develop a thorough understanding of the management 
philosophy and history of the organization. 
Communication was identified as a key to the successful 
integration of acquisitions. The following strategies were 
identified to support integration in the area of 
communication: 
1. Transmit information on plans, changes, goals, 
philosophies, time tables, and introductions of key 
personnel immediately following the announcement of 
the acquisition. 
2. Involve top management in written communication, 
meetings, and personal appearances throughout the company. 
3. Reflect a genuine interest in and commitment to the 
new acquisition and its employees. 
4. Convey a knowledge of the company and an 
understanding of its history. 
5. Provide for two-way communication. Solicit and be 
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receptive to information, ideas, opinions, and involvement 
of newly acquired personnel. 
Newly acquired managers expressed a need for 
affirmation from the organization. Leadership, management 
styles, and philosophies that encouraged participation in 
decision making and foster autonomy in work appeared to 
support the integration process. Strategies to prevent or 
resolve barriers to integrating new managers were: 
1. Evaluate management through individual career 
planning and performance, suspending assumptions about 
judgements based on the performance of the acquired company. 
2. Maintain a clear, objective rationale for 
terminating personnel. 
3. Provide opportunities and necessary tools for 
personnel to be successful. 
4. Recognize achievements formally and informally. 
Change management is a necessary support for successful 
integration. The impact of change was compounded in the 
integration process following the acquisitions because the 
pace of change was accelerated and intensified. The 
following strategies were identified to prevent and resolve 
barriers related to change management: 
1. Accept and openly acknowledge that change is an 
inevitable and desired part of the process. 
2. Provide training in change management for both 
acquiring and acquired managers. 
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3. Allow flexibility in integration plans to 
accommodate random change. 
Common perceptions and experiences were identified 
among managers interviewed, although the acquisitions were 
unrelated. Strategies were suggested to reduce or to 
resolve the barriers to the integration of an acquisition 
based upon those common experiences and perceptions. It 
must be noted that these suggested strategies are related to 
the integration phase and that this research did not explore 




Summary, Conclusions and Implications, 
and Recommendations for Further Study 
The reverberations of acquisitions and mergers affect 
millions of people directly or indirectly annually. 
Managers are cited as the most highly impacted group. The 
body of research available on this impact is slowly 
expanding. The systematic research that exists is oriented 
more toward the study of survival following the integration 
or the examination of how to maintain organizational morale 
and productivity. Research to understand perceptions and 
attitudes or identifying obstacles and supports for the 
process is limited. 
The effects of change following an acquisition or 
merger are multilayered and interactive. The movement 
toward creating a new organization destroys as it creates. 
The work environment and the organizational culture are 
redesigned to reflect the new order. Those affected must 
redefine goals, expectations, norms, beliefs, assumptions, 
and values which formed the strategic connections to their 
organizational lives. 
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The purpose of this study was to identify the obstacles 
and supports encountered by managers in integrating an 
organization following an acquisition or merger and to 
suggest means for preventing and resolving barriers based on 
the experiences of those who have been involved in the 
process. Existing prescriptive research for organizational 
change was examined as it relates to the process of 
integrating organizations following an acquisition or 
merger. 
The underlying intent of this research was to deepen 
the understanding of the human dynamics involved in the 
integration of acquisitions and mergers. Specifically, this 
research sought to answer five questions: (a) What were the 
identifiable patterns of experiences and perceptions on the 
integration process of acquisitions and mergers among 
managers who have been a part of the process? (b) What 
barriers and supports following an acquisition or merger 
were identified by managers? (c) What similarities and 
differences in perceived barriers and supports were 
identified by managers in the acquired organization and 
managers in the acquiring organization? (d) Could 
differences in expectations between managers of acquired and 
acquiring organizations be identified? If these differences 
did exist, how was the integration process impacted? 
(e) What procedures for prevention and resolution of the 
identified barriers could be identified from the data? 
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Interviews were conducted with thirteen managers and 
three presidents and/or chief executive officers 
representing three textile companies who had made horizontal 
acquisitions. Subjects included managers who were employed 
by the acquired company at the time of the acquisition and 
managers who were employed by the acquiring company at the 
time of the acquisition. 
Research Questions 
The perceptions of the managers interviewed offered 
valuable insights into the interpretive "Why?" This 
research contributes to a fuller understanding of the human 
dynamics involved in the large scale organizational changes 
resulting from an acquisition or merger. The specific 
research questions are answered. 
Question a: What were the identifiable patterns of 
experiences and perceptions on the integration process among 
managers who have been a part of the process? 
Six common themes were identified in the research 
relevant to how integration was perceived by the managers 
interviewed: personal history and work experience, 
perception of loss or gain, attitude toward change, 
communication, valuing of individuals, and perceived 
opportunities for growth. 
Question b: What barriers and supports following an 
acquisition or merger were identified by managers in the 
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acquired organization and managers in the acquiring 
organization? 
Personal histories and experiences which valued 
commitment and stability appeared to encourage managers to 
move forward with the new company. Deeply forged management 
styles from years of application that had grown resistant to 
modification were significant barriers to the process. 
Acquired and acquiring managers perceived resistance to 
change as an obstacle to integration. Individuals who 
appeared to be successful at some level within the new 
organization described adapting to the changing environment 
rather than clinging to the policies, procedures, and 
expectations of the past. Acquiring managers who were 
described as supportive of the integration process also 
demonstrated a willingness to adapt to the new organization. 
Individuals who perceived the change as an improvement 
or a gain offered less resistance, even to the point of 
welcoming the integration. Those who viewed the integration 
as a loss expressed more difficulty supporting the 
integration and found it more acceptable to leave the 
organization. 
Immediate, clearly stated, constant, and consistent 
communication supported the integration of the acquisitions. 
Direct communication and interaction with managers at the 
highest levels of the organizations, including chief 
executive officers, presidents, and owners, generated the 
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greatest support for the process. Withholding information, 
blocking communication channels, and refusal to listen were 
obstacles to the process. Companies can support the process 
of integration by expeditiously detailing benefits, goals, 
expectations, and objectively evaluating significant aspects 
of the acquired company for value and retention. 
Question c: What similarities and differences in perceived 
barriers and supports were identified by managers in the 
acquired organization and managers in the acquiring 
organization? 
Both differences and similarities existed between 
managers in the acquired companies and managers in the 
acquiring companies in the perceived barriers and supports. 
There was no disagreement in the need for communication to 
support the integration. All managers interviewed perceived 
communication as a key to successful integration. However, 
managers in two of the acquired organizations perceived the 
communication to be "one way." They viewed the 
communication as coming down to them as the transmission of 
information and instructions with limited opportunity for 
input. 
The perception of the acquisition as a loss or as a 
gain was a source of differing perspectives. Acquiring 
managers in each of the integrations perceived the 
acquisition as a gain for the acquired company. The 
perceptions of managers in the acquired companies 
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varied in relation to perceived personal losses in 
opportunities for growth and to the amount of anxiety 
experienced in the process related to job security and 
performance. 
The managers in the acquired firms reported 
experiencing more anxiety than those in the acquiring firms. 
This anxiety appeared to be related to the perceived loss of 
control over the situation. Acquiring managers appeared to 
be aware that the ultimate decisions rested with the 
acquiring company, but believed that the primary control for 
job retention, which was performance, rested with the 
individuals. 
Both acquired and acquiring managers perceived 
resistance to change as an obstacle to integration. The 
perceived resistance to change from the acquiring company 
was described as more related to systems and in the acquired 
companies the resistance was perceived as more related to 
individuals. 
Question d: Were there differences in expectations between 
managers of acquired and acquiring organization? If 
differences did exist, how was the integration process 
impacted? 
Both acquired and acquiring managers expected the 
integrations to be successful. A major difference in 
expectations was related to the change process itself. The 
managers of the acquiring firms were expecting to initiate 
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change while the managers of the acquired firms expressed an 
expectation that they would be changed. 
Another differing expectation was that the majority of 
the acquired managers expressed a desire to be given the 
opportunity to prove themselves to the acquiring company, 
but appeared to expect their jobs to be terminated 
regardless of the level of performance. Acquiring managers 
appeared to expect failure by the majority of the acquired 
managers. 
Question e: What procedures for prevention and resolution 
of the identified barriers could be identified from the 
data? 
Preacquisition planning to include the human resource 
component appeared to facilitate the integration process. 
The following procedures for the prevention and resolution 
of barriers were suggested by this research. 
1. Develop a clear vision of the organizational 
integration with clearly defined roles for key players. 
Involve acquired managers as soon as possible. 
2. Prepare a written strategy outlining goals to 
provide consistent direction. 
3. Conduct an objective evaluation of systems and plans 
for system consolidation. 
4. Conduct an objective appraisal of financial, 
managerial and production capabilities of both 
organizations. 
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5. Develop a thorough understanding of the management 
philosophy and history of the organization. 
Communication was identified as a key to the successful 
integration of acquisitions. The following strategies were 
identified to support integration in the area of 
communication: 
1. Transmit information on plans, changes, goals, 
philosophies, time tables, and introductions of key 
personnel immediately following the announcement of 
the acquisition. 
2. Involve top management in written communication, 
meetings, and personal appearances throughout the company. 
3. Reflect a genuine interest in and commitment to the 
new acquisition and its employees. 
4. Convey a knowledge of the company and an 
understanding of its history. 
5. Provide for two-way communication. Solicit and be 
receptive to information, ideas, opinions, and involvement 
of newly acquired personnel. 
Newly acquired managers expressed a need for 
affirmation from the organization. Leadership, management 
styles, and philosophies which encourage participation in 
decision making and foster autonomy in work appeared to 
support the integration process. Strategies to prevent or 
resolve barriers to integrating new managers were: 
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1. Evaluate management through individual career 
planning and performance suspending assumptions about 
judgements based on the performance of the acquired company. 
2. Maintain clear, objective rationale for terminating 
personnel. 
3. Provide opportunities and necessary tools for 
personnel to be successful. 
4. Recognize achievements formally and informally. 
Change management was a necessary support for 
successful integration. The impact of change was compounded 
in the integration process following the acquisitions 
because the pace of change was accelerated and intensified. 
The following strategies were identified to prevent and 
resolve barriers related to change management: 
1. Accept and openly acknowledge that change is an 
inevitable and desired part of the process. 
2. Provide training in change management for both 
acquiring and acquired managers. 
3. Allow flexibility in integration plans to 
accommodate random change. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The experiences related offer insight for those who 
must channel the changes resulting from the integration of 
an acquisition or a merger toward constructing a successful, 
new organization. These shared experiences and perceptions 
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also are valuable to increase the understanding for those 
managers who are impacted by the process. Such 
understanding can facilitate personal inner peace through 
shared experiences and acceptance. As such, it merits 
review. 
This research also provides elements through which to 
examine the existing body of prescriptive research offered 
to support successful integration. A single model for 
organizational change did not emerge from this research. 
The interactive process of integrating organizations 
precipitates reverberations which cannot totally be 
predicted or planned. Successful integration requires 
managers who are cognizant of the nature of change. They 
must understand that change is dynamic and complex and, as 
such, demands multiple approaches. 
The data supports research such as studies by Ansoff, 
et al., (1971), Drucker (1981), and Marks (1982), that 
identify adequate planning as a prerequisite for successful 
integrations. Managers who are facilitating the merger 
process must be involved early to impact and monitor such 
variables as the adequacy of financial resources and 
management skills and depth. 
Communication is a powerful tool in the integration of 
organizations. The findings of this research support other 
research (Buono and Bowditch, 1985; Morse, et al., 1987; and 
Fulmer and Gilkey, 1989) that encourages immediate, clearly 
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stated, constant, and consistent dissemination of 
information to minimize anxieties created by a lack of 
understanding or misunderstanding. Direct communication 
from and with those managers at the highest levels of the 
organization such as presidents, chief executive officers, 
and owners generate the greatest support for the process. 
The timing of the communication is as important as the 
information conveyed. Immediate and consistent 
communication not only clearly delineates expectations but 
also conveys a sense of inclusion as opposed to exclusion. 
Such communication is a prerequisite for managers who are 
attempting to build a sense of belonging. 
Leadership, management styles, and philosophies which 
encourage participation in decision making and foster 
autonomy support the integration process. Acquiring 
management can enhance personal job security, confidence, 
and job satisfaction by conveying recognition and trust. 
Suspending assumptions concerning the adequacy or inadequacy 
of the newly acquired managers is required in order to 
provide an opportunity for success. 
The need for change management skills is increased in 
the integration of acquisitions and mergers because the pace 
of change is accelerated and intensified. These 
acquisitions precipitated permanent systematic changes which 
required adaptation. The adjustment described in this 
research related to integrating acquisitions suggested an 
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expectation, by those managers who reported the greatest 
difficulties, that the organization would return to a 
previous state. The existence of these expectations can 
compound the use of inappropriate strategies creating 
problems from difficulties (Watzlawick, et al., 1974). 
Therefore, training for both acquiring and acquired managers 
in change management could decrease the cost of trial and 
error approaches to change. 
This research supports Quinn's (1980) strategies for 
change managers. Managers involved in the integration of an 
acquisition or a merger are acutely aware of each act or 
omission involved in the process. Successful integration 
requires a careful consideration of incremental decisions 
and constant evaluation of the results. 
The avoidance of Utopian attempts (Watzlawick, 
Weakland, and Fisch, 1974) is recommended in integrating 
organizations. Managers who are morally convinced that they 
possess the perfect solution will compound the difficulties 
created by the change process. The likelihood for personal 
failure also is increased for these managers because they 
establish expectations which cannot be achieved. 
Utopian solutions may not exist for integrating 
acquisitions and mergers. However, this research indicates 
that leaders who approach the integration process with the 
intention of creating a positive work environment that 
values people (Shea, 1987) and shares a vision of the 
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"common good" (Norse, Feldman, and Martin, 1987) are better 
equipped to facilitate the process. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
The following recommendations for further study emerge 
from this research: 
1. This research examined the perceptions of managers 
on the integration of acquisitions and mergers in the 
textile industry. Obstacles and supports to the process 
were identified through an interpretation of those 
perceptions. Other studies can be conducted to validate the 
success in applying the suggested strategies. 
2. Further studies, qualitative and quantitative, 
could expand the subject base to include managers from other 
industries and examine the impact of different types of 
acquisitions on this data. Expansion of the data base and a 
quantitative approach would permit generalization to other 
populations. 
3. The change process could be a focus of another 
study to explore the types of change and apply the framework 
to evaluate solutions suggested by Watzlawick, et al. The 
results of such a study could have implications for the 
planning stages for the integration of acquisitions and 
mergers. 
4. Research, indirectly related to the integration of 
acquisitions and mergers, could focus on the impact of the 
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introduction of new managers to work settings, particularly 
managers who possess the authority to initiate changes in 
organizational policies and procedures such as site managers 
and division presidents and vice presidents. The results of 
such research would have implications for management and 
leadership development programs. 
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